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ABSTRACT 
Atoxigenics and crop insurance are available to producers to reduce economic loss 
from aflatoxin contamination in corn.  Atoxigenics have shown in both test and practice to 
reduce aflatoxin contamination in corn.  There have been a few studies on the economic 
feasibility of atoxigenics.  This study expands a previous study that analyzed the 
economics of using atoxigenics for aflatoxin control in Bell County, Texas.  The current 
study expands the previous study to other major corn producing districts in Texas.  The 
current study also implements the One Sample Strategy aflatoxin testing method. 
The objective of this study is to perform an economic analysis on the decision to 
use atoxigenic treatments on a corn crop and to evaluate the economic outcomes at 
different crop insurance coverage levels for corn production in Texas.  The study used a 
risk based partial budget simulation model combined with an aflatoxin contamination 
simulation model to complete a risk analysis on the decision to use atoxigenics in various 
agricultural districts in Texas.  Field-level data for aflatoxin contamination comes from 
Bell County, Texas.  The aflatoxin distributions for the Blacklands were adjusted to 
reflect the relative mean and variance indicated by Isakeit’s ranking of aflatoxin incidence 
for the remaining districts.  
Net incomes of a representative farm of 500 acres were simulated with and 
without atoxigenic treatments.  Each scenario was simulated across a range of crop 
insurance options available to corn producers in their respective agricultural districts in 
Texas.  A total of 882 scenarios were simulated and compared based on net income. 
iii 
Results show that, prior to crop insurance, atoxigenics provide financial benefits 
for seven of the nine Texas agricultural districts in the study.  The treated non-insured net 
incomes of the Blacklands, Coastal Bend, Edwards Plateau, Lower Valley, South Central, 
South Texas, and Upper Coast districts were $10/acre to $40/acre higher than the 
untreated non-insured net incomes of the same districts.  The Northern High Plains and 
Southern High Plains districts’ results show that it is not cost effective to use atoxigenics.  
The treated non-insured net incomes from the Northern High Plains and Southern High 
Plains were $4.07/acre and $7.43/acre lower, respectively, than the untreated non-insured 
net incomes from the same districts.  When crop insurance was incorporated into the 
model, the results show that six of the nine agricultural districts have financial incentives 
to use atoxigenics for aflatoxin control.  The Blacklands, Coastal Bend, Edwards Plateau, 
Lower Valley, South Central, and Upper Coast districts had higher net incomes for treated 
scenarios than non-treated scenarios.  The South Texas, Northern High Plains, and 
Southern High Plains had higher net incomes for non-treated scenarios than treated 
scenarios. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Overview 
Mycotoxins are toxic fungal metabolites that occur in a wide variety of feeds and 
foods (Richard, et al., 1989).  Aflatoxin is a mycotoxin that is a chronic problem in 
agriculture.  Aflatoxins are produced primarily by strains of Aspergillus flavus and 
Aspergillus parasiticus (Richard, et al., 1989).  The species are soil born organisms, that 
can produce aflatoxins as they attach and build on a food source (Horne, et al., 1991).  
Consumption of aflatoxin contaminated feeds and foods are known to have detrimental 
health effects on humans and animals (Sampson, 2014).  The International Agency for 
Cancer Research has classified aflatoxins as a group 1 carcinogen (International Agency 
for Cancer Research, 1993).       
 In Texas, grain elevators penalize corn price with a discount if aflatoxin is 
present (Sampson, 2014).  A discount schedule links the level of aflatoxin contamination 
to the percent discount on corn price.  In 2014, Texas producers harvested nearly 2 
million acres of corn yielding over 290 million bushels (NASS 2014), and in 2013, corn 
contributed approximately $1.4 billion to the state’s economy (Sampson, 2014).  The 
risk level for aflatoxin varies throughout regions Texas.  Central Texas, eastern Texas, 
and the coastal bend tend to have higher aflatoxin levels on average than do west Texas 
and the panhandle regions.  Humidity followed by dry weather tends to be the climate 
that provides the appropriate environment for aflatoxin accumulation (Sampson, 2014).   
 Mitigation methods have been developed to combat aflatoxin contamination.  A 
non-aflatoxin producing strain of Aspergillums flavus, atoxigenics, can be applied to the 
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corn plant to prevent aflatoxin producing strains of the fungus from developing.  Crop 
insurance is another method in which the producer can protect from losses associated 
with aflatoxin contamination.  If losses from aflatoxin push the yield or revenue below 
the guaranteed amount, an indemnity is paid to the producer.  However, tests for 
aflatoxin at grain elevators are separate tests from the tests for crop insurance.  It is 
possible that the grain elevator test could result in a higher level of aflatoxin than the 
crop insurance test, leaving the producer with an indemnity that does not cover the loss 
from the elevator. 
 Previously, there has been an economic analysis regarding the use of atoxigenics 
and crop insurance for protection against losses from aflatoxin. Sampson (2014) 
completed the economic analysis used data from Bell County, Texas.  However, there is 
a need to expand this study from Central Texas to other parts of the state.  The current 
study will also use a different aflatoxin testing method than the previous study.  
 This paper will highlight the previous information and research performed in this 
area of study.  This study will include the variables needed to expand the previous study 
to the rest of Texas.  Past and similar studies will be reviewed, the methodology used in 
this study will be described, and finally the results of the economic model will be 
presented and analyzed.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Corn producers in the Blacklands agricultural district have access to an aflatoxin 
risk management decision tool.  The decision tool uses data from Bell County, Texas.  
   
3 
The rest of Texas is lacking an economic analysis of the use of atoxigenic mitigations for 
preventing losses from aflatoxin.  Professional opinion and results from the economic 
analysis for Central Texas may encourage the use of atoxigenic treatments; however, an 
economic analysis needs to be performed for the other regions of the state. 
 
 
1.3 Objective 
The objective of this paper is to expand a former study of using atoxigenic 
treatments and crop insurance on corn crops.  This study will expand the former study 
from Central Texas to the rest of the state, and use the One Sample Strategy for aflatoxin 
testing.  The study will analyze the economic outcomes of using atoxigenic treatments 
along with different crop insurance coverages levels for corn in the major corn 
producing regions in Texas.  This paper will use an updated corn production partial 
budget simulation model combined with an aflatoxin contamination simulation model to 
perform a risk management analysis on the decision to use atoxigenic mitigation 
methods.  Data used for the simulation model are unique to major corn producing 
regions in Texas.  The current study will assist decision makers throughout the state of 
Texas by considering the risk of aflatoxin contamination, level of contamination, 
discrepancies of aflatoxin testing, cost of the atoxigenic treatment, premiums and 
indemnities for crop insurance for the decision maker’s region, stochastic yield for the 
decision maker’s region, and the stochastic corn price localized to the decision maker’s 
region.  Figure 1 shows the crop reporting districts of Texas. 
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Key Code 
Numeric 
Name 
Geographic 
Name 
 
11 District 
1-North 
Northern 
High Plains 
 
12 District 
1-South 
Southern 
High Plains 
 
21 District 
2-North 
Northern 
Low Plains 
 
22 District 
2-South 
Southern 
Low Plains 
 
30 District 3 Cross 
Timbers 
 
40 District 4 Blacklands 
 
51 District 
5-North 
North East 
Texas 
 
52 District 
5-South 
South East 
Texas 
 
60 District 6 Trans-Pecos 
 
70 District 7 Edwards 
Plateau 
 
81 District 
8-North 
South 
Central 
 
82 District 
8-South 
Coastal Bend 
 
90 District 9 Upper Coast 
 
96 District 
10-North 
South Texas 
 
97 District 
10-South 
Lower Valley 
 
 Figure 1 Map of Crop Reporting Districts in Texas (NASS, 2015) 
 
Figure 2 Map of Crop Reporting Districts in Texas (NASS, 2015) 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 2.1 Affected Area of Aflatoxin in Texas 
 Aflatoxin has historically been a problem in certain regions of the United States 
that produce corn, peanuts, and cotton.  Aflatoxins develop in the corn kernel whenever 
the plant is undergoing stress (Horne, et al., 1991).  Drought is the most common form 
of plant stress in Texas.  Damage to the corn plant from insects also creates a more 
favorable environment for aflatoxin.  The corn producer’s production practices also 
influence aflatoxin contamination.  Cultural practices that lead to reduced soil moisture 
can cause plant stress, leaving the plant at more risk for aflatoxin contamination (Horne, 
et al., 1991).      
 Reports suggest that approximately 25% of the world’s food crops are affected 
by mycotoxins (Richard, et al., 1989).  The consumption of aflatoxins has been 
implicated as a possible cause of liver cell cancer (LCC) in humans (Richard, et al., 
1989).  Health risk associated with human and animal health is common in developing 
countries where exposure to aflatoxins are widespread (Sampson, 2014).  Developed 
countries such as the United States have regulatory agencies that do spot checks to 
insure a wholesome food supply (Horne, et al., 1991).  Aflatoxin related problems in 
developed countries consist of rejection or price discounts at grain elevators and 
negative impacts on animal health (Sampson, 2014).  The economic impact that 
aflatoxin has on corn is difficult to quantify because affected crops vary across years and 
regions (Richard, et al., 1989).  Aflatoxin contamination is estimated to cost the United 
States approximately $500 million (Vardon, McLaughlin, & Nardinelli, 2003).  
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Regulatory agencies are necessary to monitor testing and conduct research regarding 
aflatoxin and its consequences.  It is estimated that $30-$50 million is spent on aflatoxin 
management in the United States (Robens & Cardwell, 2003).      
 In the United States, states with hotter climates in the southeast and southwest 
are more susceptible to aflatoxin cooler states in the North and Midwest (Lubulwa & 
Davis, 1994).   In Texas, aflatoxin contamination is most commonly found in the East 
Central Texas and Coastal Bend regions, however aflatoxin is also found in the 
Northeast region and to a lesser extent the Panhandle region. Regions experiencing 
drought and other environmental stresses are more likely to develop aflatoxin in corn.  
However, even in this environment, affected crops may be randomly scattered 
throughout the stressed region (Horne, et al., 1991).  It is difficult to forecast the 
upcoming or current year’s aflatoxin contamination risk because of the randomness of 
affected crops.  Below is the 2014 map of aflatoxin occurrences (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Aflatoxin Cases Reported in Texas from 2014 Corn Crop (OTSC 2014) 
 
 
 
2.2 Aflatoxin Regulations 
 Corn exporting countries, such as the United States, must regulate the aflatoxin 
levels in corn and other crops or risk losing export markets abroad (Lubulwa & Davis, 
1994).  The United States limits aflatoxin contamination to 20 ppb for use in human food 
(Lubulwa & Davis, 1994).  Countries importing corn from the United States tend to limit 
aflatoxin levels more strictly.  Corn used in human food in Japan is limited to 10 ppb 
(Lubulwa & Davis, 1994).  Many European countries limit aflatoxin levels to 4 ppb, for 
corn used in human food (Lubulwa & Davis, 1994). Aflatoxin limits in the United States 
varies among crops and uses for the crops.  Table 1 portrays the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration limits for aflatoxin in feed.   
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Table 1 FDA Action Levels for Aflatoxins in Animal Feeds (FDA, 2015) 
Aflatoxin 
Limit Commodity Use of Commodity 
20 ppb 
Corn, Peanuts, Cottonseed 
Meal Dairy animals, non-specific 
20 ppb Corn, Peanuts Immature animals 
100 ppb Corn and Peanut products 
Breeding beef cattle, breeding 
swine, mature poultry 
200 ppb Corn and Peanut products Finishing Swine >100 lbs 
300 ppb Cottonseed Meal Beef Cattle, Swine, or poultry 
300 ppb Corn and Peanut products Finishing feedlot beef cattle 
 
 
 
 Texas complies with the FDA limits in the table, but has a few separate rules in 
addition.  To meet the requirement for “Texas Standard for Wildlife Feed,” the feed 
must be less than 50 ppb (OTSC, 2011).  Corn with aflatoxin contamination with 300-
500 ppb requires a blending permit from the Office of the Texas State Chemist 
(Sampson, 2014), or must be destroyed.  Any grain with more than 500 ppb cannot enter 
the marketplace and must be destroyed with a record of disposition submitted to the 
Office of the Texas State Chemist (Sampson, 2014).   
 
2.3 Aflatoxin Testing    
The 1990 Farm Bill requires all exported corn to be tested to insure the corn 
aflatoxin levels do not exceed the acceptable levels (GIPSA, 2009).  Domestic corn must 
comply with the Food and Drug Administration’s action levels.  Aflatoxin testing 
services are provided by the USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA) (GIPSA,2009).  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and 
the Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS) have agreed to a Memorandum of 
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Understanding that when a lot of grain/rice/processed product tests over 20 ppb, the 
FGIS will notify the FDA (GIPSA, 2009).   
 There are two types of screening often used to test for aflatoxin.  Blacklight 
testing is the initial test that detects the presence of Aspergillus flavus (Munkvold, 
Hurburgh, & Meyer, 2012). Blacklight testing has limited use because there is no 
guarantee that aflatoxins are present in the fungus (Munkvold, Hurburgh, & Meyer, 
2012).  Commercial tests are another testing method that Munkvold and colleges 
indicate offers a more accurate test.  Commercial testing requires a 5 lb to 10 lb sample 
of grain.  The sample is then ground before removing a subsample for the test kit 
(Munkvold, Hurburgh, & Meyer, 2012).  The results from the test kit reveal aflatoxin 
presence and level of contamination.  An alternative to using the blacklight test or 
commercial test is to send the sample to an official  USDA-FGIS laboratory (Munkvold, 
Hurburgh, & Meyer, 2012).   
 
2.4 Crop Insurance Indemnity Calculations 
 The crop insurance coverage options used in this study are Yield Protection, 
Revenue Protection, and Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion.  Indemnities 
for each of the three coverage options are calculated for each Texas agricultural district 
in this study.  Optional coverage refers to using one of the three insurance options on 
selected acres of the insured crop (Iowa State University Extension and Outreach, 2013). 
Enterprise coverage refers to grouping all of the producer’s insured crop in the same 
county under one insurance policy (Iowa State University Extension and Outreach, 
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2013).  Each agricultural district in the study will have an indemnity for each of the three 
crop insurance coverage options.  When calculating the partial budget, a premium for 
enterprise and optional coverage will be assigned for Yield Protection, Revenue 
Protection, and Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion.   
 Yield protection (YP) is a crop insurance policy that protects the producer 
against yield losses from natural causes such as drought, flood, hail, wind, insects, and 
disease (USDA-RMA, 2015).  The producer is assigned an average yield based on 
his/her past crop yields.  The producer selects a percentage of the average yield to insure.  
The production guarantee (PG) that the producer may select are in 5% increments from 
50% - 85% of the average yield.   
PG = acres insured * average yield * percentage of average yield insured 
PTC = acres * actual yield for growing season 
The projected price from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) is used as a price for 
the coverage option should there be an indemnity (USDA-RMA, 2015).  The producer 
insures a percentage of the projected price in case of an indemnity.  The producer may 
insure 5% increments from 55% - 100% of the projected price (for this study it is 
assumed that the producer selected to insure 100% of the projected price). An indemnity 
is triggered whenever the producer’s actual production to count (PTC) is less than the 
production guarantee (PG).    
Indemnity = (PG - PTC) * price guarantee 
 PTC is the total yield from the acres that are under the insurance policy.  The PTC can 
be discounted if the quality of the corn is low or reduced by a natural disaster or farming 
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practice.  Depending on the level of contamination, aflatoxin can be a cause of reduction 
of quality as demonstrated by Table 2.  A load of corn that tests over 20 ppb of aflatoxin 
is assigned a reduction in value (RIV) (Sampson, 2014).   The extent of the RIV 
increases with the level of aflatoxin.  If aflatoxin is found in the corn the producer may 
receive either no discounts, varying discounts, or a destructive order (RMA, 2012)  A 
discount schedule is used to link the level of aflatoxin to the discount.  The RIV rates are 
determined by the grain elevator where the corn is sold.  A discount factor is derived 
from the RIV, which in turn is used to derive a quality adjustment factor (QAF) 
(Sampson, 2014).  The QAF is used to reduce the PTC for crop insurance purposes.   
RIV = determined by the grain elevator 
DF = RIV/market price at grain elevator 
QAF = 1-DF 
The adjusted PTC = total production of insured acres * QAF 
The adjusted PTC is used for crop insurance purposes to calculate indemnities 
(Sampson, 2014).  If afltoxin levels are high enough to drop the PTC below the 
production guarantee, the producer may receive an indemnity for the difference.   
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Table 2 Discount Schedule for Aflatoxin (RMA, 2012) 
Aflatoxin Range 
ppb Discount Factor 
.1 - 20 0 
20.1 - 50 0.1 
50.1 - 100 0.2 
100.1 - 200 0.3 
200.1 - 300 0.4 
300.1 & Above .5 or 1* 
*If corn is utilized then the discount is .5, or if corn must be destroyed the discount is 1.0  
 
 
 
Revenue Protection (RP) is a crop insurance policy that protects against yield 
losses from natural causes such as drought, flood, hail, insects, or disease, and revenue 
losses when the harvest price decreased below the projected price (USDA-RMA, 2015).  
Under this coverage policy, the producer insures a percentage of his average yield and 
insures the minimum price he will receive at harvest.  The producer insures yield from 
50% - 85% of the average yield in 5% increments.  Projected price is set at 100% of the 
CME futures price (USDA-RMA, 2015).  The producer has the option of using the 
higher of  projected price or the market price at the time of harvest.  The percent 
guarantee of average yield multiplied by the higher of projected price or harvest price 
gives the producer a revenue production guarantee (RPG).  Following harvest, the total 
PTC is multiplied by the harveset price to calculate the value of production to count 
(VPTC).  The indemnity is equal to the difference between RPG and VPTC if difference 
is positve.  
RPG = acres insured * production guarantee * max(projected price or harvest 
price) 
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VPTC = PTC * harvest price 
Indemnity = RPG – VPTC 
 Revenue protection with harvest price exclusion (RPHE) is calculated the same 
way as RP, but harvest price is not used for the RPG.  RPG for RPHE is calculated by 
multipying acres insured * production guarantee * projected price (USDA-RMA, 2015).  
For both RP and RPHE, PTC is a factor in determining if the producer gets an indemnity 
and the amount of the indemnity.  Aflatoxin contamination could increase the QAF 
reducing the PTC.   
 
2.5 Aflatoxin Mitigation Methods 
  There are several methods to prevent aflatoxin contamination.  Certain 
production methods may be followed to decrease the chances of afltoxin contamination.  
Planting early can guard against late season drought and heat, two key factors of 
aflatoxin (Horne, et al., 1991).  Cultural practices that require minimum soil disturbance 
should be used to conserve soil moisture (Horne, et al., 1991).  If possible, applying 
irrigation during pollination decreases the chances of Aspergillus flavus infestation (Ball, 
1998).  Fertilization can reduce the risk of aflatoxin as deficiency in nitrogen and 
phosphorus have shown in studies to increase the risk of aflatoxin contamination (Horne, 
et al., 1991).  Control of insects and weeds reduces plant stress that can increase the risk 
of aflatoxin (Horne, et al., 1991).  Harvesting early when the kernals are near 20% 
moisture and quickly drying the kernals to 15% moisture prohibits  Aspergillus flavus 
from completing its life cycle (Ball, 1998).  During harvest, lowering the combine fan 
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speed to reduce the physical damage to the kernals reduces aflatoxin (Horne, et al., 
1991).  
 Post-harvest methods are equally important because Aspergillus flavus also 
spreads on corn in storage (Sampson, 2014).  Prior to storage, bins should be cleaned to 
insure that clean corn is not stored with contaminated corn.  Proper aeration and control 
of pest are necessary to reduce the risk of contaminating the corn while in the storage bin 
(Sampson, 2014).   
 Certain varieties of seed corn are more resistent to aflatoxin than others.  Bt, 
Bacillus thuringiensis, is a corn variety that significantly reduces mycotoxin 
contamination (Wu, 2006).  However, the mycotoxin that Bt most effectively guards 
against is fumonisin not aflatoxin (Wu, 2006).  Bt corn is resistant to insects which 
damage the corn kernal.  Although insect damage does increase the risk for aflatoxin, 
there are other substantial factors that lead to aflatoxin contamination.  There is a mixed 
record of Bt corn’s resistance to aflatoxin.  However, studies have shown that in fields 
treated with Aspergillus flavus inoculum, lower levels of aflatoxin were found in Bt corn 
than non-Bt corn (Wu, 2006).   
 Non-Aflatoxin producing strains of Aspergillus flavus can be applied to corn 
fields to reduce the risk of aflatoxin contamination.  AF-36 and Afla-Guard® are 
commercial strains of Aspergillus flavus. Both strains are atoxigenic, meaning they do 
not produce aflatoxin. AF-36 is heat-killed wheat seed colonized by the fungus (Isakeit, 
2011a).  It is labeled for aflatoxin in Texas corn and cotton and is produced by the 
Arizona Cotton Research and Protection Council (Isakeit, 2011a).  The Texas distributor 
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of AF-36 is Double CT LLC.  Afla-Guard® is hulled barley seed coated with spores of 
the fungus, and labelled for aflatoxin control on Texas corn and peanuts. Syngenta Crop 
Protection, Inc. produces Afla-Guard® and is distributed by dealers who sell their 
products (Isakeit, 2011a).  The focus of the study will be to determine the cost 
effectiveness of AF-36 and Afla-Guard®.   
 The atoxigenic strains work in the same manner, they attempt to crowd out the 
aflatoxin producing strains of the fungus (Isakeit, 2011a).  The dormant fungus begins 
growing on the seed as a food source.  New spores will be produced after a few days, 
and will spread to the silk of the corn plant.  The fungus will then grow into the ear and 
colonize the kernals before the native aflatoxin producing strains develop (Isakeit, 
2011a).  The atoxigencs compete with toxic strains for limited growing space.  
According to Isakiet, “whoever occupies that space first, prevails.  They cannot be 
bumped from the space by their competitors.”  The strategy is to apply the atoxigenics to 
the corn field before silking with numerous spores that outnumber the native aflatoxin 
producing strains (Isakeit, 2011a).  AF-36 is labelled for application between the V-7 
and silking, and Afla-Guard® is labelled for application between V10-V12 and silking 
(Isakeit, 2011a).   
 Texas A&M Agrilife Extension Service has conducted experiments using test 
plots to measure the effectiveness of Afla-guard® and AF-36.  Isakeit conducted a study 
that discusses the results of the test in terms of parts per billion.  The test plots consisted 
of dry land corn in Texas counties. Aflatoxin levels in test plots treated with atoxigenic 
strains were compared to those of untreated control test plots.  The aflatoxin level in 
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2011 Nueces county corn treated with Afla-Guard® was 2 ppb, which was 6 % of the 
untreated control aflatoxin level (31 ppb) (Isakeit, 2011b).  Hill, Colorado, and Ellis 
counties also showed a reduction of aflatoxin levels on the test plots treated with an 
atoxigenic strain; although only Colorado and Ellis counties had statistically significant 
reductions (Isakeit, 2011b).   In another study, Dorner et al. tested the effectiveness of 
atoxigenic strains in reducing aflatoxin contamination.  Afla-Guard® was applied to 
entire fields in two areas of Texas with non-treated control fields in the same respective 
areas.  The two year study (2007 and 2008) indicated significant reduction of aflatoxins.  
The 2007 and 2008 mean aflatoxin levels for treated fields were 85% and 88% less than 
their respective non-treated control test plots (Dorner, 2010).  While these studies show 
that atoxigenic strains can reduce aflatoxin levels, they do not provide analysis regarding 
economic effectiveness. 
 
 
2.6 Sources of Risk 
 As both Horne et al. (1991) and Richard et al. (1989) pointed out, aflatoxin 
contamination is a random event.  Although environmental factors such as drought 
increase the risk for aflatoxin; there are no guarantees aflatoxin will be present in a given 
field.  The risk of aflatoxin varies from year to year, however the cost of purchasing and 
applying atoxigenics is fixed.  There are two negative scenarios that producers face 
when deciding whether to purchase atoxigenics.  One scenario is that the producer does 
not purchase the atoxigenic, but the year presents extreme growing conditions.  If this 
happens and aflatoxin contaminates the corn, the producer must accept a RIV or possibly 
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the loss of a crop.  The second scenario is the inverse: the producer purchases the 
atoxigenic, but the growing conditions are favorable.  Favorable growing conditions 
typically do not result in aflatoxin contamination (Horne, 1991).  In the latter scenario 
the economic benefits of the atoxigenic are less than the cost to purchase and apply the 
atoxigenic (Sampson, 2014).  The decision to use an atoxigenic is a risk because the 
decision could be a net cost rather than a net benefit. 
 Testing variability is another source of risk.  As described in the report by 
Munkvold and colleges, a 5 to 10 pound sample of corn is taken to test the load of 
approximately 1,000 bushels (60,000 lbs).  It is difficult to insure that the results from a 
5 to 10 pound test represent the aflatoxin level for the entire load or field.  Inaccurate test 
results can have extreme negative consequences on both the buyer and seller (Sampson, 
2014).  There are two potentially negative scenarios: a false positive and a false 
negative.  A false positive portrays more aflatoxin than there acutally is.  Inversly, a 
false negative portrays less aflatoxin than there actually is (Sampson, 2014).  A false test 
will either harm the buyer or the seller.   
 A common practice in the industry is to find an elevator that performs a test with 
favorable results.  If the test results at an elevator show an aflatoxin level greater than 
300 ppb, the seller can drive to another elevator in hopes of test results lower than 300 
ppb.  Grain elevators, feedlots, and other downstream corn buyers risk buying a load 
with a higher level of aflatoxin than they believe it is.  The consequence the false 
negative on the part of the grain elevator is not being able to sell the contaminated load 
to downstream buyers.   
   
18 
 Originally there are two separate aflatoxin tests.  Producers have their corn tested 
at the grain elevator before sale, and a crop insurance adjustor also tests the corn to 
determine loss of production due to aflatoxin contamination.  Depending on the tests, the 
local grain elevator may discount the price with an RIV.  RIVs in this study are 
calculated by deducting a percent of the market price.  However, it is common to deduct 
a pre-determined amount for different levels of aflatoxin contamination.  Also different 
grain elevators may have their own unique discount schedules, which may be changed at 
the grain elevators discretion.  If a RIV is given, the producer now relies on collecting an 
insurance indemnity to cover the loss.  For the crop insurance tests, an adjustor either 
takes a sample from the corn field or uses a sample saved by the producer or grain 
elevator.  Because the insurance test is a separate affair, there is a possibility that the 
insurance test could result in less aflatoxin than the grain elevator test.  In this situation, 
the producer would take a price discount at market, but would not recover all of the loses 
through a crop insurance indemnity.  The potential risk for two separate tests is having a 
severe aflatoxin caused price discount, but the insurance test not triggering an indemnity 
payment (Sampson, 2014). 
    The risk of different testing results between local grain elevators and crop 
insurance agencies has prompted a more regimented approach to aflatoxin testing.  One 
Sample Strategy is the testing method that brings Texas producers, crop insurance 
agents, and local grain elevators, feed mills, and regulators proper information about the 
true level of aflatoxin going into and out of corn bins (OTSC, 2015).  The One Sample 
Strategy method standardizes the testing process and reduces the variability between 
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separate aflatoxin tests.  The program participants must use testing equipment approved 
by GIPSA to sample and grind corn, and must use GIPSA performance verified testing 
kits that have been validated by the Office of the Texas State Chemist.  The One Sample 
Strategy tests are recognized as official results for crop insurance purposes as well as 
regulatory compliance (OTSC 2015).  Using only one test will diminish the variability of 
using separate testing methods.  However, there is still a risk for a false positive or false 
negative test (Sampson, 2014).  As of 2014, there are 29 Texas grain elevators certified 
for the One Sample Strategey (OTSC 2015).   
 
2.7 Aflatoxin Effects on Average Yield 
 Yield history is a key component of calculating crop insurance indemnites.  The 
crop insurance coverage options used in this study protect against yield loss due to 
natural causes.  The average yield is used to set a yield or revenue guarantee.  Aflatoxin 
can be a cause of an adjusted PTC, which can trigger an indemnity for the current 
growing year.  Although receiving an indemnity for losses triggered by low yield is 
beneficial to producers, the reduced PTC is in the yield history for 10 years.  The 10 year 
yield history is used to calculate the average yield used for insurance premiums and 
indemnities (Iowa State University Extension and Outreach, 2013).  Atoxigenics guard 
against yield losses caused by aflatoxin contamination.  In addition to possible cash flow 
benefits for a single production year, the reduction of afltoxin via atoxigencs could 
increase the 10 year averge yield history.  The increase in yield history, increases the 
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production guarantee that is used determine insurance indemnities for the future growing 
season.   
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Studies have indicated that atoxigenics can effectively reduce aflatoxin 
contamination in corn.  Many studies document both the human and animal health 
effects of consuming aflatoxin and other mycotoxins.  Economic analysis is less 
common than the agronomics and health effects of aflatoxin, but there are a handful of 
studies that have attempted to determine the economics of aflatoxin risk management.   
 Sampson (2014) analyzed the economic benefits of using AF-36 and Afla-
Guard® on corn in Bell County, Texas.  The analysis consisted of aflatoxin 
contamination levels, county yields and price, and crop insurance coverage options for 
Bell County.  Aflatoxin levels from fields treated with AF-36 or Afla-Guard® were used 
to create a distribution for aflatoxin contamination in treated fields.  Likewise, aflatoxin 
levels from non-treated fields were used to create a distribution for fields not treated 
with the atoxigenics.  A Texas A&M Agrilife Extension corn production budget for 
extension district 8 was used simulate a partial budget for a 500 acre field.  Net revenues 
for the field were simulated using the treated aflatoxin probability distribution and the 
non-treated aflatoxin probability distribution.  In addition to two aflatoxin probability 
distributions yield protection, revenue protection, and revenue protection with harvest 
price exclusion crop insurance policies were used in calculating the partial budget.  Each 
policy had coverage options ranging from 50% - 85% with 5% increments.  Non-insured 
treated and non-treated net revenues were the key output variables.   In total there were 
50 scenarios simulated net revenues. 
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 Sampson (2014) reported that aflatoxin tests were recordered from 110, 92, and 
114 fields during the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 respectively.  The recorded tests were 
separated into treated and non-treated fields to estimate the probability distribution for 
aflatoxin.  Using empirical distributions, stochastic aflatoxin in ppb was simulated for 
treated and non-treated fields.  Aflatoxin results from the simulation, calculated that 
treated fields tested by local elevators had an average aflatoxin level in ppb of 2.62, with 
a standard deviation of 13.92.  The simulation for non-treated fields tested at local 
elevators had an average aflatoxin level in ppb of 39.65 with a standard deviation of 
75.71.  Simulation results for treated fields tested by crop insurance adjustors had an 
average aflatoxin level of 4.87 ppb, with a standard deviation of 25.85.  The simulation 
for non-treated fields tested by crop insurance adjustors had an average aflatoxin level of 
73.60 ppb, with a standard deviation of 140.49 (Sampson, 2014).   
 Sampson (2014) used the simulated grain elevator aflatoxin levels to calculate 
the RIV; and the crop insurance aflatoxin levels were used to calculate the QAF for 
insurance purposes.  The market price and total PTC were then used to calculate market 
revenue for treated and non-treated corn.  The summary statistics for market revenue 
were then simulated.  The average market revenue for the treated scenario was 
$376.68/acre, with a standard deviation of $105.90/acre.  The average market revenue 
for the non-treated scenario was $350.73/acre, with a standard deviation of $98.99/acre 
(Sampson, 2014).  Net revenue was then calculated by subtracting production cost.  
Production cost for treated fields were greater than that of non-treated fields by $16/acre 
because of the cost and application of the atoxigenic.  Without the inclusion of crop 
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insurance, the average net revenue for treated fields was $107.22/acre, with a standard 
deviation of $105/acre.  The average net revenue for non-insured non-treated fields was 
$97.19, with a standard deviation of $97.35 (Sampson, 2014).  However, when crop 
insurance was factored into the partial budget, the higher net revenues were for the non-
treated scenarios.  On average the treated field’s indemnities were lower than the 
premiums paid for crop insurance, but the non-treated average indemnites were 
considerably higher than the premuims (Sampson, 2014).  Sampson’s study was that 
crop insurance premiums, priced by the USDA – Risk Management Agency, for treated 
fields are too high.  The study indicated that in Bell County, Texas, purchasing crop 
insurance but not atoxigenics is more profitable than purchasing crop insurance and 
atoxigenics.   
 The Sampson study is beneficial to understanding the factors that influence the 
decision to use atoxigenics.  The current study will expand this study from one district to 
the rest of the major corn producing districts in Texas.  Sampson (2014) used a testing 
variance of 53%, meaning the aflatoxin tests at grain elevators were 53% lower than 
aflatoxin test at crop insurance agencies.  The current study will implement the One 
Sample Strategy, which will reduce the testing variance between entities to 0%.  
Sampson (2014) allowed each load to be tested 3 times using 3 random tests.  If load 1 
tested over 300 ppb, a new test is performed, and so on until the third test.  The first test 
with a result under 300 ppb is used in the model.  Each additional test cost $0.17/bushel.  
The current test will perform a max of 2 tests.  If the first test’s results are over 20 ppb, a 
second test will be conducted.  The second test uses the first test’s result as mean, and 
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has a relative variation of 20% of the first test.  If 2 tests are performed, the average of 
the 2 are used in the model.  Both test are performed at the same location, so no 
additional cost will be associated with the second test. 
  The USDA-ARS and Delta Research and Extension Center of Mississippi State 
University conducted an experiment to analyze both efficacy of biological control of 
aflatoxin and its economic feasibility.  Weaver, Abbas, Falconer, Allen, Pringle, and 
Sciumbato (2015) conducted trials of Afla-Guard® and another atoxigenic strain of 
Aspergillus flavus, K49.  The experiment consisted of fourteen field trials in Stoneville, 
Mississippi and additional trials on private farms in the region.  The aflatoxin levels 
from the treated portion of the field were compared to the non-treated portion of the 
field.  The atoxigenic treatments resulted in a decrease in the level of aflatoxin (Weaver 
et al., 2015).   Their economic analysis compared the benefits of using Afla-Guard® and 
K49 with their respective cost.  The benefits consisted of higher grain price because of 
the higher quality of grain.  For their experiment, aflatoxin levels above 20 ppb were 
penalized $0.394 per metric ton per ppb aflatoxin up to 300 ppb (Weaver et al., 2015).  
Corn that was above 300 ppb was rendered unmarketable and was destroyed.  The 
discount gives a price advantage to treated corn because the treated corn has a smaller 
probability of having high levels of aflatoxins.  The negative factor of using Afla-
Guard® or K49 was the cost of the treatments.  Ten of the fourteen test plots did not 
contain enough aflatoxin to cause economic harm (aflatoxin was less than 20 ppb) 
(Weaver et al., 2015).  The profitability of the treatments came from the four fields that 
experienced higher levels of aflatoxin in the control portion of the field (Weaver, Abbas, 
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Falconer, Allen, Pringle, & Sciumbato, 2015).  The economic analysis concluded that 
the use of Afla-Guard® and K49 as a form of atoxigenic control for aflatoxin is only 
profitable if the corn field experiences high levels of aflatoxins (Weaver et al., 2015).  
The article stated that to increase the profitability of using atoxigenics such as Afla-
Guard®, better aflatoxin forecasting methods are needed.  An accurate aflatoxin 
forecasting model is a key factor for determining whether the use of atoxigenic strains of 
Aspergillus flavus is economically feasible.  
 The Weaver et al. (2015) study demonstrates the basics of cost effectiveness of 
atoxigenics.  The aflatoxin testing methodology is unclear, but probably was performed 
in a laboratory.  The study shows the financial incentives of using atoxigenics in the 
Mississippi Delta without insurance coverage levels.  The current study factors insurance 
coverage levels into the model.  Analyzing indemnities for yield losses due to aflatoxin 
allows for a more complete analysis.    
 Testing variability is a key risk component of aflatoxin contamination, 
determining the effectiveness of atoxigenics, and ultimately the producer’s net revenue 
(Sampson, 2014).  Testing variability impacted both the Sampson study and the study by 
Weaver et al. (2015).  In the Sampson study, aflatoxin testing for crop insurance was on 
average approximately 53% higher than tests conducted by grain elevators (Sampson, 
2014).  The discrepancy resulted in lower RIVs at market and higher indemnities for 
corn testing positive for aflatoxin.  The testing variance between the crop insurance test 
and the grain elevator test potentially undermined the economic feasibility of the 
atoxigenic treatments.  The study by Weaver et al. (2015) indicated that more accurate 
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aflatoxin forecasting methods could improve the economic feasibility of atoxigenic 
treatments.  
 A study conducted by Johansson et al. (2000) attempted to calculate aflatoxin test 
variance in a mathematical equation.  The objective of their study was to determine 
functional relationships between variance components and aflatoxin concentration.  The 
study consisted of two experiments estimating test variance using variable sample sizes 
(kg), subsample size (g), and number of aliquots to measure a certain aflatoxin 
contamination level (ppb) using a Romer mill and liquid chromatography (LC) testing 
procedures.  The first experiment was an unbalanced nested procedure designed to 
measure three types of variance: total variance, combined variance of sample preparation 
and analysis, and sampling variance.  According to Johansson et al. (2000), “total 
variance is the sum of sampling, sample preparation, and analytical variance and 
depends on sample size, mill type, subsample size, number of aliquots, and analytical 
procedure.” Sample variance represented the variance of different test samples taken 
from the same lot of shelled corn.  Sample preparation variance represented the 
variability of replicate subsamples taken from the same test sample (comminuted in the 
same mill).  Analytical variance is the variance of replicate aliquots of extracts of a 
single subsample (Johansson et al. 2000).   
The Johansson et al. (2000) experiment used 18 lots of shelled corn.  A bulk 
sample of 45.4 kg was taken from each of the 18 lots.  Each bulk sample was divided 
into 32 test sample each weighing 1.13 kg.  Each of the 32 test samples were 
comminuted in a Romer mill. Two 50 gram subsamples were removed from 16 of the 32 
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comminuted samples (32 total subsamples), and one 50 gram subsample was taken from 
the remaining 16 comminuted samples (16 total subsamples).  Each of 50 subsamples 
was tested for aflatoxin.  The second experiment was designed to measure the analytical 
variance of subsamples in experiment 1.  Ten subsamples were chosen from selected 
samples in the first experiment (Johansson et al., 2000).      
Results  of aflatoxin levels and variances were reported in a chart (Johansson et 
al., 2000).  The results indicated a positive correlation between aflatoxin concentration 
and test variance.   Johansson et al. (2000) used variances specific to 1.13 kg test 
samples and 50 g subsamples to predict the test variance of any given sample size.  
Equation 10 was modified to predict the variance of a sample depending on variables: 
aflatoxin concentration (?̂?), sample size in kg (Ns), subsample size in grams (nss), 
number of aliquots (na).  The total variance estimate of the aflatoxin test, 𝑆2?̂?(𝑡), is the 
result of the equation.  
𝑆2?̂?(𝑡) = [(12.95/𝑛𝑠) ∗ ?̂? .98] + [(62.70/𝑛𝑠𝑠) ∗ ?̂?1.27] + [(. 143/𝑛𝑎) ∗ ?̂?1.16] 
Using equation 10, a lot is corn tested with an aflatoxin concentration of 20 ppb, sample 
size of 1.13 kg, Romer mill comminuted subsample of 50 g, and quantifying 1 aliquot 
per subsample.  The total variance, sampling, sample preparation, and analytical 
variances are 274.9 (CV = 82.9%), 214 (CV = 73.1%), 56.3 (CV = 37.5%), and 4.6 (CV 
= 10.7%) respectively (Johansson et al., 2000).  The results indicate that sampling 
variance accounted for 77.8% of the total variance, while sample preparation accounts 
for 20.5% and analytical accounts for only 1.7% (Johansson et al., 2000).   
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In 2007, Parks et al. (2007) conducted a similar study. Their objective was to 
determine variability in aflatoxin test using the Aflatest method and the high-
performance column liquid chromatography (HPLC).  Ten different grain elevators 
tested corn for aflatoxin contamination using the Aflatest method, and the Louisiana 
Agricultural Chemistry (LAC) Laboratory tested corn using both the Aflatest method 
and the HPLC method (Park et al., 2007).   
 Corn from 10 grain elevators were used by Park et al. (2007).  One truck load at 
each grain elevator was used to collect samples.  Two 4.5 kg test samples were taken 
from each truckload.  One of the 4.5 kg test was ground at the grain elevator and the 
other ground at the LAC laboratory.  Three 50 g subsamples were then taken from each 
comminuted 4.5 kg test sample at each location.  The cooperating grain elevator then 
performed an aflatoxin test for two 50 g subsamples (one from the sample ground at the 
elevator and one from the sample ground at the LAC laboratory).  The LAC performed 
an aflatoxin test for four 50 g subsamples (two from the samples ground at the grain 
elevator and two from samples ground at the LAC laboratory).  The two subsamples 
tested by the grain elevator quantified aflatoxin in only1 aliqout, while the four 
subsamples tested by the LAC laboratory quantified aflatoxin in two aliqouts from each 
subsample.    
 Results showed that Aflatests at the LAC laboratories were 46.2% higher than 
the Aflatest at the grain elevators (Park et al., 2007).  The null hypothesis that LAC 
Aflatest would have no difference than grain elevator Aflatest was rejected at the 95% 
confidence limit at 4 grain elevators, and no significant difference was detected at 5 
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grain elevators (Park et al., 2007).  When only examing the LAC results, the HPLC tests 
were about 18% higher than the Aflatest tests (Park et al., 2007).   
 Total variability was caluculated by summing the sampling, sample preparation, 
and analytical variances (Park et al., 2007).  Total variances associated with HPLC and 
Aflatest were plotted with full log plots versus aflatoxin contamination.  The total 
variances appeared to be a function of aflatoxin concentration (Park, et al., 2007).  
Equations 11 and 12 describe the variances for the Aflatest (𝑆2𝑡𝑙𝑎) and the HPLC test 
(𝑆2𝑡𝑙ℎ) methods.  C represents aflatoxin concentration.   
𝑆2𝑡𝑙𝑎 = 2.80 𝑥 𝐶1.282 
𝑆2𝑡𝑙ℎ = 4.714 𝑥 𝐶1.203 
The conclusion to the Park et al. (2007) study suggested several reasons why the 
aflatoxin test at LAC were different from the aflatoxin test at the grain elevators.  LAC 
laboratories probably have better equipment and technology for testing as well as 
scientists to properly run the test.  Parks et al. (2007) also indicated that the work 
environment could be a factor.  A laboratory could offer a more favorable work 
environment to perform the tests properly, whereas conducting the tests at the grain 
elevators facility could be more difficult.  The total variance estimates for the HPLC and 
Aflatest testing methods were 173.2 (CV = 65.8%) and 130.7 (CV = 57.2%), 
respectively.  The sampling variance was the highest of the variances used to calculate 
total variance (Park et al., 2007).   
 Total variability results from Park et al. (2007) are similar to those of the 
Johansson et al. (2000) study.  In both studies sampling variability accounts for most of 
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the total variability.  An important find in the study by Park et al. (2007) was that 
aflatoxin testing in grain elevators were 46.2% lower than tests performed by the LAC 
laboratories.  The descrepancy results in a lower RIV for contaminated corn and a higher 
indemnity.  From the producer’s position, the descrepancy diminishes the value of 
atoxigenics.  The difference between the grain elevator tests and crop insurance test also 
creates a problem for grain elevators.  When the grain elevator tests a truckload of corn, 
they test and assign an RIV for aflatoxin levels.  When the grain elevator sells the corn, 
the business purchasing the corn also performs a test.  If the business buying the corn 
from the grain elevator tests the corn at a laboratory, there is a 46.2% chance the results 
will show higher aflatoxin levels.  There are two negative scenarios for the grain elevator 
in this situation.  One is the corn might have tested under 300 ppb at the grain elevator 
but over 300 ppb at the buyer’s laboratory.  In this case, the grain elevator cannot make 
the sale and loses the cost of the corn and its hauling.  The second case is the grain 
elevator tested the corn at a lower aflatoxin level than the laboratory, but the corn was 
still under 300 ppb.  In this case, the RIV the grain elevator assigned to the producer was 
less than the RIV the business buying the corn assigned to the grain elevator.  
Consequently, the grain elevator sells the corn for less than the price for which it was 
bought (Welch, 2015).  The risk of test descrepancy can be applied to any downstream 
business that buys and sells corn. 
 An example of a grain elevator that uses the One Sample Strategy is William 
County Grain Elevator.  After the grain elevator has tested a truck load of corn, the seller 
recieves a testing certificate that is accepted by crop insurance agencies.  The grain 
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elevator uses the same type of testing equipment as the Office of the Texas State 
Chemist (OTSC).  The manager of the grain elevator oversees the testing facilities to 
insure the test are as accurate as possible.  Sampling is done in a meticulous manner to 
improve accuracy.  Nine different sections of the truck load are probed to gather corn 
from all parts of the trailer, totaling between five and ten pounds of sample.  The nine 
samples are thouroghly blended and ground.  A 50 gram subsample is taken from the 
sample and tested for aflatoxin.  The producer may request a retest if he feels the first 
test wasn’t accurate.  The second test is taken from different 50 gram subsample of the 
original 10 pound sample.  The grain elevator takes the average of the two tests as the 
final test result.  The final test result is used to assign RIVs and is a valid test for the crop 
insurance agency as well (Owen, 2015).   
 Management at the Williamson County Grain Elevator makes it a priority to 
create an adequate testing environment to assist the employees perform an accurate test.  
OTSC tested a corn sample and sent the same sample to William County Grain Elevator.  
Twice daily the grain elevator tests the sample to calibrate their test equipment.  By 
checking to make sure the grain elevator’s test results are the same as the OTSC test 
results, testing descrepancies are reduced.  Additionally the grain elevator sends their 
own tested samples to OTSC to compare testing results.  According to the manager of 
the grain elevator, the results are similar.  The manager also said that the results of the 
tests of subsample 1 and subsample 2 (if requested by the seller) usually have a variance 
of 20% or less.  Testing methods of William County Grain Elevator reduce testing 
descrepancies between the elevator and crop insurance agencies as well as OTSC.  Also 
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the sampling methods and testing methods reduce the variance of testing the same truck 
load. 
 The literature review of relative studies gives an insight into what has been done 
and what problems still remain.  Atoxigenics have been effective at reducing aflatoxin in 
most studies, but testing variability and crop insurance coverage can prevent them from 
being cost effective.  The Johansson et al. (2000) and the Park et al. (2007) studies 
described testing variance as a function on afltoxin concentration.  By lowering aflatoxin 
levels, atoxigenics could effectively lower testing variance.  Another way to combat the 
testing variability is to use the One Sample Stragtegy method with repeated 
recalibration.  The use of this method will reduce the descrepancies between grain 
elevetor and crop insurance tests.  One official test will also protect downstream 
businesses from sampling variance.  If grain elevators and crop insurance agencies used 
the same test, the 46.2% difference could be eliminated.  Putting RIVs and indemnities 
on equal playing fields could increase the cost effectiveness of atoxigenics.  
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4. THEORY 
 This chapter will explain the theory behind the methodology.  Because of the 
high levels of risk in this study, risk and uncertainty will be discussed, along with 
degrees of risk aversion.  The theory behind ranking risky scenarios will also be 
described, along with subjective utility functions used in this study. 
 
4.1 Risk and Uncertainty 
 Risk and uncertainty has a been a part of agriculture since the first seed was 
planted and the first animal was domesticated.  Farmers do not know whether any given 
year will be rainy or a drought.  As generalized by Richardson (2008), “risk is the part of 
a business, the manager cannot control.”  Market prices, yields, and changes in input 
cost were rated the most important sources of risk and uncertainty by farmers in Texas 
and parts of Kansas (Richardson, Simulation for Applied Risk Management with an 
introduction to Simetar, 2008).  In regards to this study, corn producers do not know 
whether the upcoming or current year will have no, low, or high aflatoxin levels.  
According to Hardaker et al. (2004a), risk is imperfect knowledge where the 
probabilities of the possible outcomes are known, and uncertainty exist when the 
probabilities of known outcomes are not known.  Risk can be defined as uncertain 
consequencs, and uncertainy as imperfect knowledge (Hardaker et al., 2004a).  Anderson 
and Dillon (1992) state that uncertainty is always present in decision making in 
agriculture, but risk is present when the consequences of uncertainty will affect the well-
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being of the decision maker (DM).  When making a risky decision, the DM must 
compare the possible outcomes of different risky choices.   
 
4.2 Risk Classification 
 Different DM’s have different tolerances for risk.  Generally, there are three 
categories that a DM falls into.  The categories include risk averse, risk neutral, and risk 
loving (Nicholson & Snyder, 2012).  According to Syder and Nicholson (2012), 
individuals are risk averse if they exhibit a diminishing marginal utiltity of wealth.  A 
risk averse DM prefers a guaranteed income over a risky income, so long as the expected 
values are the same.  In addition, the DM is willing to pay a certain amount to avoid 
participating in the risky gamble (Nicholson & Snyder, 2012).  The majority of farmers 
are assumed to be risk averse (Hardaker et al., 2004a), and for the purposes of this study 
the assumption will be that the DM is risk averse. 
 The risk aversion levels in farming varies depending on variables such as size 
and location of the operation, whether the crops are irrigated or dryland, and the 
personality of the farmer in general.  The generalization that all farmers are risk averse, 
does not mean every farmer has the same utility function as there are degrees of risk 
aversion.  Some degrees of risk aversion used by Richardson (2008) text are hardly risk 
averse, normal risk averse, rather risk averse, very risk averse, and extremely risk averse.  
Appropriate degree classification is crucial to conduct an accurate risk analysis.  The 
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(W), is the most convenient representation 
of the DM’s level of risk aversion (Meyer & Meyer, 2007).  The utility function 
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determines the highest expected value among available alternatives.  However, the utility 
function is only unique to a positive linear transformation.  The lack of uniqueness to 
different DM’s makes using the utility function to compare levels of risk aversion 
difficult (Meyer & Meyer, 2007).  According to Hardaker et al. (2004a), an accurate 
measure of degree of risk aversion is more important than the choice of the utility 
function. 
  Pratt (1964)  and Arrow (1965) proposed a way to measure the degree of risk 
aversion by calculating an absolute risk aversion coefficient (ARAC).  The ARAC is 
measured  in the following equation:  A(W) = - U”(W)/U’(W).  The equation to 
calculate ARAC for a person with normal risk aversion is derived as 1/W, which 
indicates the ARAC decreases as wealth (W) increases (Pratt, 1964).  Risk aversion 
levels could increase, decrease, or remain constant depending on changes in wealth 
(McCarl and Bessler, 1989).  Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965), classified risk aversion  
depending on its relationship with change in wealth.  The classifications include 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA), 
and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) (Arrow, 1965).  DARA indicates that the 
DM is less averse to risk as wealth increases.  IARA indicates that the DM is more risk 
averse as wealth increases.  Finally, CARA indicates that DM’s risk aversion level is 
unchanged as wealth increases (Arrow, 1965) and (Pratt, 1964).    
 ARAC uniquely measures risk aversion for individual DM’s by using the first 
and second derivatives of their utility function.  However, there is a disadvantage of 
using ARAC.  ARAC cannot properly scale the outcome variable (Meyer & Meyer, 
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2007).  Whenever the same output variable is described in a different unit of measure, 
ARAC cannot change to fit the new unit of measure.  This is a problem when dealing 
with wealth in different forms of currency, comparing nominal wealth of different time 
periods, or converting decimals to percentages during studies (Meyer & Meyer, 2007).  
To combat this problem Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) proposed a relative risk aversion 
coefficienct. RRAC was designed to make units of measure consistent across varies 
studies.  RRAC was created multiplying wealth by ARAC.  RRAC can be described as: 
R(W) = ARAC * W.  RRAC added the advantage of consistent value that does not 
change when the outcome variable is measured by a different unit (Meyer & Meyer, 
2007).  
 
4.3 Subjective Utilities 
 Subjective probability refers to beliefs held by individual DM’s that reflect their 
degree of uncertainty about an event (Bessler, 1984).  Individual DM’s have unique 
expectations about outcomes of various events.  The DM’s view on probabilities of 
events occuring and probabilities of consequences are their subjective expected utility 
(SEU) (Hardaker et al., 2004a).  The DM’s SEU is defined: U(Wi) = ∑(Pi*(U(Wi))), 
where U(Wi) is the utility of wealth in state i, and Pi is the probability of weath (W) 
occuring in state i.  When choosing between different risky scenarios, most DM’s will 
choose the scenario that yields the highest utility.  The problem with using SEU is that 
the probabilities are subjective to individual DM’s expectations, but to accurately obtain 
a SEU from each DM is not possible for a large study. 
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4.4 Certainty Equivalent 
 Another approach to ranking risky alternatives is using certainty equivalents 
(CE).  The CE of a risky prospect is the sure sum with the same utility as the expected 
utility of the risky prospect (Hardaker, 2004b).  Given a utility function, the CE is the 
point of indifference between the sure sum and the risky prospect.  In other words, the 
DM will only prefer the risky prospect if its utility is higher than the sure (guaranteed) 
sum.  In Figure 3, Nicholson and Snyder (2012) relate CE to a fair bet.  The bet offers a 
50-50 chance of winning or losing $h.  The utility of current wealth is U(Wo), which is 
also the expected value of current wealth.  The expected utility of participating in the 
gamble is EU(A),  EU(A) = 
1
2
𝑈(𝑊𝑜 + ℎ) +
1
2
𝑈(𝑊𝑜 − ℎ), which also is the CEA.  The 
expected utility of the gamble is equal to the utility of current wealth, EU(G) = U(Wo).  
In this case the CEA has the same expected utility as not participating in the bet, thus a 
risk averse DM would not participate in the bet.  Risk averse producers do not 
participate in fair bets because the certainty equivalent is not greater than initial utility.  
If the gamble doubled to a 50-50 chance of winning or losing $2h, then the DM would 
be even more unwilling to participate in the bet (Nicholson & Snyder, 2012).  A 
disadvantage of using CE to rank risky scenarios is it also requires a utility function 
unique to the DM.   
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Figure 3 Utility of Wealth from Two Fair Bets (Nicholson and Snyder 2012) 
 
 
4.5 Second Degree Stochastic Dominance 
 Second Degree Stochastic Dominance (SSD) is a method to assist DM’s with 
varying degrees of risk aversion rank risky scenarios.  Hardaker et al. (2004b) made the 
assumptions that more wealth is preferred to less wealth and the DM is not risk loving.  
Risk aversion bounds for SSD are between 0 and positive infinity for risk averse DMs 
(Hardaker et al., 2004b).  SSD can rank risky scenarios in Excel by calculating the sum 
of the differences between distributions over all iterations for two cumulative 
distribution functions (CDFs) (Richardson 2008).  The disadvantage of SSD is that it 
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does not discriminate enough to yield useful results, meaning the efficient set can still be 
too large to manage easily (Hardaker et al., 2004b).    
 
4.6 Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function 
 Meyer (1977) proposed stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) 
as a way to rank risky scenarios using a lower risk aversion coefficient and an upper risk 
aversion coefficient.  SDRF ranks risky scenarios at both the lower and upper RACs, 
which is useful to choose scenarios when their respective CDFs cross (Richardson 
2008).  The consistency of SDRF is limited when the lower RAC and the upper RAC are 
too far apart, causing a lack of discrimination between the RAC bounds (Richardson 
2008).   
 
4.7 Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function 
 Hardaker et al. (2004b) created stochastic efficiency with respect to a function 
(SERF) by merging the CEs with lower and upper RACs used by Meyer (1977).  SERF 
evaluates many RACs between the lower and upper bounds, giving SERF the advantage 
over SDRF (Richardson 2008).  In addition, SERF will use a lower ARAC of 0 for risk 
neutral DMs and an upper ARAC of 4/wealth to represent an extremely risk averse DM 
by analyzing risk ranking over neutral to very risk averse.  This method considers all 
levels of risk aversion in SERF. 
 In this study, SERF is used to rank empirically estimated probability distributions 
of net income for alternative treated, not treated, and insurance scenarios.  There is little 
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change of income in respect W0, therefore a negative exponential function form with 
CARA assumptions will be used.  SERF will rank a set of risky scenarios under the 
assumption of a risk averse DM. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Simulation 
 According to Richardson (2008), the purpose of simulation in risk analysis is to 
estimate distributions of economic returns for alternative strategies so the DM can make 
more educated decisions.  Simulation is useful when making decisions in risky 
situations.  Simulating the returns of each risky alternative gives the DM the estimates of 
their probability distribution function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF).  
The PDF and CDF offer a visual representation of the potential outcomes and 
demonstrate the probability of each outcome occurring.   
 Monte Carlo simulation techniques offer a method of analyzing investments 
under conditions of uncertainty (Richardson & Mapp 1976).   Subjective probablility 
distributions can be specified for the stochastic variables influencing the performance of 
an investment.  Random values are drawn to obtain simulated values for the key 
economic variables.  Results from the simulated values can concentrate the associated 
risk to a single value, such as net income.  The PDF or CDF for the single value can then 
be used by the DM to make an educated decision (Richardson & Mapp 1976).  This 
study will use Monte Carlo simulation techniques with Latin Hypercube sampling.  
Simetar®, an add in to Excel, is used to simulate 500 iterations for the stochastic 
variables to test their possible outcomes of net income.  The first step for developing a 
model is to determine the stochastic variables that influence the DM’s decision to use 
atoxigenics and estimate probability distributions for the stochastic variables.  The 
influential stochastic variables are simulated and used as input variables in the model to 
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simulate the impact of the stochastic variables on the key economic variables (net-
income).  For simulation of random variables, the distribution of the variable must be 
defined and their parameters must be estimated (Reutlinger, 1970).   
 The current study will simulate and estimate probability distribution using 
empirical distributions for the following stochastic variables: yield, price, and aflatoxin 
levels.  The stochastic variables are specific to the individual agricultural districts in 
Texas.  Aflatoxin levels have two separate distributions, one for fields treated with 
atoxigenics and one for fields not treated.  The separate aflatoxin probability 
distributions are used to calculate QAF for yield and RIV for price.  The RIVs are for 
both grain elevators and crop insurance agencies, while QAFs are used only by crop 
insurance agencies.  Crop insurance indemnities are calculated for both non-treated and 
treated fields.  Crop insurance coverage policies include: yield protection, revenue 
protection, and revenue protection with harvest price exclusion.  Each policy will have 
coverage options ranging from 50%-85%, in 5% increments.  The resulting 50 crop 
insurance coverages will be used for both enterprise and optional policies.  Partial 
budgets will be used to calculate net income for each of the coverage options.  In 
addition to insurance coverage options, net income will be simulated for non-treated and 
treated fields that are not insured .  In total there are eight crop insurance options, each 
option is simulated for non-treated and treated fields, all crop insurance calculations are 
for both enterprise and optional coverage policies, and addtionally there are non insured 
options for both non-treated and treated.  The total number of simulations sums to 100 
simulated options for each corn producing agricultural district in Texas. 
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5.2 Validation and Verification 
 Simulated variables will be verified and validated after simulation.  Key 
economic variables such as net income must be verified.  Verification includes checking 
the soundness of calculated equations and insuring that cell references are accurate.  In 
Excel, the trace precedents/dependents function will be used to insure equations are 
calculated with the correct cell references.  Validation will be performed via hypothesis 
testing.  Simulated means of stochastic variables are compared to their respective 
historical means.  Likewise, simulated variances are compared to historical variances.  
To fail to reject the null hypothesis indicates that the simulated means are statistically 
equal to historical means, validating the soundness of the stochastic variables 
(Richardson 2008). 
 
5.3 Model Development 
 Once the empirical distributions for the stochastic variables are developed, they 
are linked to the deterministic variables to calculate indemnities and revenues.  
Stochastic yield is multiplied by total acres and QAF to calculate crop insurance 
indemnities.  Market revenue and indemnites are summed to calculate total revenue.  
Finally, cost is subtracted from total revenue to calculate a stochastic net income.   
 The necessary mathematical equations are programmed to incorporate the 
stochastic variables to calculate the key economic variable, net income.  Once 
calculated, net incomes for 100 scenarios are analyzed using SERF.  The SERF analysis 
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determines the efficient set of options, given crop insurance coverage levels and the 
choice of using atoxigenics. 
 
5.4 Data 
 The estimated corn budgets for the agricultural districts were taken from the 
Texas A&M Agrilife Extension website (Extension 2015).  The cost of the atoxigenics 
used, $11, and the aerial cost of application, $5, were taken from the Sampson study 
(Sampson 2014).  Sampson obtained the the prices from contact with Georgia Pirtle of 
Pirtle Crop Insurance, in Bell County, Texas.  Yield history since 1968 used to simulate 
corn yields for each agricultural district in the model were found on the national 
agricultural statistics service webpage (NASS 2015).  Historic prices since 1980 used to 
simulate the Texas price were also from NASS.  The model assumes a $3.90/bu mean 
price for 2015.  The mean price is based on projections by extension economists at 
Texas A&M Agrilife Extension.  Basis information was taken from CME to add to the 
Texas price.   
 Crop Insurance information used in the model were found on the USDA- Risk 
Management Agency webpage (USDA-RMA 2015).  The webpage provides premiums 
that are factored into the cost of each coverage option/scenario.  The webpage also 
displays the projected price used to calculate indemnity payments.  Harvest prices used 
to calculate indemnities were taken from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange webpage 
(CME 2015).   
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 Aflatoxin data were obtained from several entities.  Pirtle provided aflatoxin 
information for the project.  Pirtle reported aftatoxin test results in ppb for years 2011, 
2012, and 2013.  Along with the test results, Pirtle also reported whether or not the fields 
were treated with atoxigenics (Pirtle 2014).  Bowers, grain specialist at United Ag 
Cooperative, in El Campo, Texas provided aflatoxin levels of treated fields in the 
Coastal Bend agricultural district (Bowers, 2015).  Bowers reported 19 fields treated 
with varies levels of atoxigenics, 10 of the fields were 100% treated, while the remaining 
9 fields ranged from 83% to 20% treated.  Aflatoxin data provided by OTSC were also 
used to estimate probability distributions of aflatoxin for varies agricultural districts. 
 The Blacklands district will use a probability distribution estimated from the data 
reported by Pirtle.  The remaining agricultural districts will be distributed based on 
expert opinion of aflatoxin levels of each remaining district.  Dr. Isakiet ranked the 
aflatoxin contamination levels of the remaining districts on a scale of 1 to 10, with the 
Blacklands being a 10.  The aflatoxin distributions for the Blacklands will be adjusted to 
reflect the relative mean and variance indicated by Isakeit’s ranking of aflatoxin 
incidence.  The aflatoxin information reported by Bowers will be used to validate the 
distribution by comparing the given data to the estimated distribution.  
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6. RESULTS 
 The results are presented in this section for the Texas agricultural reporting 
districts used in this study.  Stochastic simulation results are presented for stochastic 
variables, market revenue, and indemnity payments.  Market revenue, indemnity 
payments, and atoxigenic cost are incorporated into the partial budgets used to simulate 
net income.  Net incomes of non-treated fields are compared to net incomes of treated 
fields, all with various coverage options.   
 
6.1 Stochastic Variable Results 
 Three stochastic variables were included in this study.  The variables consist of 
yield in bushels, price in $/bushel, and afltoxin contamination for non-treated and treated 
field measured in ppb.  Each district in the study used variables unique to their area.  
District results are as follows.  An empirical distribution was used for simulations.  
Every district uses the same Texas mean market price of $3.89/bushel and was simulated 
with a coefficient of variation of 14.83%.  Districts were given a unique basis. 
 The district yields were simulated for each district for the 2015 growing season.  
The simulated average yield for the Blacklands was 80.64 bushels/acre with a coefficient 
of variation (CV) of 33.34%.  The average historical basis was applied for each district 
market price.  The average historic basis for the blacklands market price is -$0.25.  The 
simulated  average yield for the Coastal Bend was 65.64 bushels/acre with a CV of 37%.  
The average historic basis for the Coastal Bend is -$0.72.  The simulated average yield 
for the Edwards Plateau district was 109.66 bushels/acre with a CV of 19.04%.  The 
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average historic basis for the Edwards Plateau is -$0.20.  The simulated average yield for 
the Lower Valley was 82.18 bushels/acre with a CV of 29.02%.  The average historic 
basis for the Lower Valley is -$0.70.  The Northern High Plains simulated average yield 
was 189.87 bushels/acre with a CV of 14.63%.  The average historic basis for the 
Northern High Plains is $0.30.  The Southern High Plains simulated average yield was 
128.85 bushels/acre with a CV of 17.74%.  The South Central district simulated average 
yield was 75.02 bushels/acre with a CV of 28.56%.  The average historic basis for the 
Southern High Plains is -$0.70.  The South Texas district simulated average yield was 
60.44 bushels/acre with a CV of 34.14%.  The average historic basis for the South Texas 
district is -$0.70.  The Upper Coast simulated average yield was 88.08 bushels/acre with 
a CV of 33.75%.  The simulated yields in Figure 4 shows the CDF of the districts’ 
simulated corn yields and do not take afltoxin contamination into account.  The 
simulated yields in Figure 4 represent the overall yield before QAFs reduce the yield.   
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Figure 4 CDF of Texas Corn Not Treated with Atoxigenics by District 
  
 
 The One Sample Strategy was used to test for afltoxin.  The One Sample Strategy 
uses one test for both grain elevator and crop insurance purposes.  There are two afltoxin 
simulations for each district, corn from non-treated and treated fields.  Districts ranked 
as a ten by Isakeit had the highest chance of having aflatoxin contamination while a 
district ranked as a zero has no chance of having aflatoxin contamination (Isakiet 2015).  
The Blacklands, Coastal Bend, and South Central districts were ranked ten.  The Upper 
Coast and Lower Valley districts were ranked a nine.  The Edwards Plateau and South 
Texas districts were ranked a seven.  The Northern High Plains and Southern High 
Plains were ranked as a one (Isakeit 2015). Table 3 shows the simulated average 
aflatoxin contamination for the ranks 1, 7, 9, and 10.  The summary statistics (Table 3) 
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show that aflatoxin levels in non-treated fields have much higher mean, maximum, and 
standard deviations than do fields treated with atoxigenics.  Non-treated fields have a 
much greater chance of having an aflatoxin conatmination greater than 20 ppb.   
 
 
Table 3 Simulated Summary Statistics for Aflatoxin Contamination by Rank (ppb) 
Variable 
Rank 10 
NT 
Rank 
10 T 
Rank 9 
NT 
Rank 
9 T 
Rank 7 
NT 
Rank 
7 T 
Rank 1 
NT 
Rank 
1 T 
Mean 73.58 4.88 66.29 4.43 51.57 3.35 7.36 0.49 
StDev 140.38 25.94 126.71 23.56 98.45 17.67 14.05 2.62 
CV 190.79 531.26 191.14 532.15 190.91 527.95 190.87 532.21 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 730.33 270.02 657.29 243.02 511.23 189.02 73.03 27.00 
Prob(Mea
n>20) 37.9% 5.3% 37.7% 5.1% 36.2% 4.8% 13.0% 0.6% 
 
 
 
 Figure 5 shows the probabilities of each district with a rank of 1, 7, 9, and 10 
having aflatoxin contamination on the vertical axis.   Non-treated fields in the districts 
with a rank of ten (Blacklands, South Central, and Coastal Bend) have a 37.9% chance 
of having aflatoxin contamination greater than 20 ppb (Table 3).  Treated fields in the 
districts with a rank of ten (Blacklands, South Central, and Coastal Bend) had a 5.3% 
chance of having aflatoxin contamination greater than 20 ppb (Table 3).  Non-treated 
fields in a district with a rank of nine (Upper Coast and Lower Valley) had a 37.7% 
chance of having aflatoxin contamination greater 20 ppb (Table 3).  Treated fields in 
districts with a rank of nine (Upper Coast and Lower Valley) had a 5.1% chance of 
having aflatoxin contamination greater than 20 ppb (Table 3).  Non-treated fields in 
districts with a rank of seven (Edwards Plateau and South Texas) had a 36.3% chance of 
having aflatoxin contamination greater than 20 ppb (Table 3).  Treated fields in districts 
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with a rank of seven (Edwards Plateau and South Texas) had a 4.8% chance of having 
aflatoxin contamination greater than 20 ppb (Table 3).  Non-treated fields in districts 
with a rank of one (Northern High Plains and Southern High Plains) had a 13.0% chance 
of having aflatoxin contamination greater than 20 ppb (Table 3).  Treated fields in 
districts with a rank of one (Northern High Plains and Southern High Plains) had a 0.6% 
chance of having aflatoxin contamination greater than 20 ppb (Table 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 CDF of Simulated Aflatoxin Contamination by District Ranking (ppb) 
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6.2 Market Revenue 
 The stochastic variables discussed in the previous section were incorporated into 
equations used to calculate total production and total market revenue.  Stochastic yield 
multiplied by 500 acres returns the total production.  It is assumed that the farmer 
delivers the corn to the grain elevator in truckloads of 1,000 bushels.  The grain elevator 
tests the truckloads of corn for aflatoxin.  A second test is performed without charge at 
the seller’s request.  If the tests resulted in an RIV, the discount was subtracted from the 
market price.  The truckload was valued at 1,000 bushels multiplied by the price after the 
RIV was subtracted.  Total market revenue was calculated by summing the value of each 
truckload.  Equations 13, 14, and 15 demonstrate the calculation of total market revenue. 
Value of Truckload = 1,000 * (Market Price-RIV) 
Number of Truckloads = (Stochastic Yield * 500)/1,000 
Total Market Revenue= Number of Truckloads * Value of Truckload 
Total market revenues were calculated for each agricultural district used for a non-
treated 500 acre field and a treated 500 acre field.  Table 4 shows the results of non-
insured market revenues by district.   
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Table 4 Market Revenues for Texas Agricultural Districts in $/Acre 
Variable Blacklands NT Blacklands T Coastal Bend NT Coastal Bend T 
Mean  275.99 321.97 207.09 241.50 
StDev  102.33 117.18 84.49 97.55 
CV 37.08 36.39 40.80 40.39 
Min  83.67 106.95 49.85 57.29 
Max  594.63 687.54 500.32 538.00 
     
  EP NT EP T Lower Valley NT Lower Valley T 
Mean  469.70 527.68 278.70 320.88 
StDev  106.33 117.71 91.67 104.41 
CV 22.64 22.31 32.89 32.54 
Min  199.75 229.09 88.52 103.29 
Max  801.79 900.06 580.63 630.67 
     
  South Central NT South Central T South Texas NT South Texas T 
Mean  306.83 358.11 211.55 237.90 
StDev  94.00 108.40 79.78 88.89 
CV 30.64 30.27 37.71 37.36 
Min  109.97 127.30 66.49 74.62 
Max  586.06 684.33 491.75 526.77 
     
  Upper Coast NT Upper Coast T NHP NT NHP T 
Mean  302.69 347.59 796.05 807.98 
StDev  107.45 120.14 160.36 162.59 
CV 35.50 34.56 20.14 20.12 
Min  100.74 127.96 321.69 327.14 
Max  657.28 721.10 1242.92 1268.06 
     
  SHP NT SHP T   
Mean  569.66 578.23   
StDev  125.61 127.36   
CV 22.05 22.02   
Min  249.04 252.27   
Max  901.38 913.80     
EP = Edwards Plateau, NHP = Northern High Plains, SHP = Southern High Plains 
NT = Not Treated, T = Treated 
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 Treated fields had an advantage in terms of market revenue (Table 4).  Without 
RIVs the treated market revenues were higher than the non-treated market revenues.  
However, to understand the benefits of using atoxigenics the cost of purchasing and 
application needs to be subtracted.  The cost of using atoxigenics includes purchasing 
cost of $11/acre plus $5/acre to apply, totaling $16/acre.  The costs of purchasing and 
applying atoxigenics (CA) were subtracted from the difference of treated (TMR) and 
non-treated market revenue (NTMR).  Equation 16 demonstrates the calculation. 
Benefit of Atoxigenic = (TMR – NTMR) – CA 
Where TMR = Treated Market Revenue 
 NTMR = Non-treated Market Revenue 
 CA = Cost of Purchasing and Applying Atoxigenics 
 
Table 5 Monetary Benefit of Using Atoxigenics on Non-Insured Fields by District 
District Benefit $/Acre 
Blacklands 29.98 
Coastal Bend 18.41 
Edwards Plateau 41.98 
South Central 35.28 
South Texas 10.36 
Lower Valley 26.19 
Upper Coast 28.90 
Northern HP -4.07 
Southern HP -7.43 
 
 
Estimates prior to crop insurance show that seven of the nine agricultural districts 
benefit from using atoxigenics.  The Northern High Plains and Southern High Plains 
   
54 
were the only districts that did not benefit from the atoxigenics.  Table 5 shows the 
results of equation 16 for each agricultural district.  Table 5 shows prior to crop 
insurance the Edwards Plateau district benefits the most from the use of atoxigenics.  As 
shown in Table 5, the difference between treated scenarios and non-treated scenarios for 
the Edwards Plateau district is $41.98/acre.  The South Central district benefited the 
second most with a treated and non-treated difference of $35.28/acre (Table 5).  The 
Blacklands had the third highest benefit of using atoxigenics with a treated to non-
treated difference of $29.98/acre (Table 5). Upper Coast had the fourth highest benefit 
with a treated to non-treated difference of $28.90/acre (Table 5).  The Lower Valley had 
the fifth highest benefit with a treated to non-treated difference of $26.19 (Table 5).  The 
Coastal Bend had the sixth highest benefit with a treated to non-treated of $18.41 (Table 
5).  South Texas was the seventh and last district to benefit from atoxigenics with a 
treated to non-treated difference of $10.36 (Table 5).  The Northern Highest had the 
lowest negative effect from using atoxigenics with a loss of $4.07/acre (Table 5).  The 
Southern High Plains had highest negative effect from using atoxigenics with a loss of 
$7.43/acre (Table 5). 
 
6.3 Crop Insurance Results 
 The stochastic yield, market price, and aflatoxin values were used to calculate 
stochastic crop insurance indemnities.  The crop insurance coverage options are yield 
protection (YP), revenue protection (RP), and revenue protection with harvest price 
exclusion (RPHE).  With each coverage option, a percentage of the average yield must 
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be selecting from a range of 50% - 85% in 5% increments.  Also each coverage option is 
under an enterprise and optional insurance policy.  For example, CBETR70 means 
“Coastal Bend district, enterprise policy, treated scenario, and revenue protection 
coverage at 70% of the average yield.”  Each district also has non-treated and treated 
options that are not insured (NI). 
 A production guarantee (PG) or value of production guarantee (VPG) was 
determined for each insurance option.  The guarantee was based on the average yield 
from the previous 10 years for each district.  For YP, production to count (PTC) was 
subtracted from PG.  If there was a positive difference, the difference was multiplied by 
a projected price to calculate an indemnity.  For RP and RPHE, the value of PTC was 
subtracted from VPG and the positive difference was the indemnity.  The One Sample 
Strategy mandates tests performed by the grain elevator are also used by the crop 
insurance agency.  Stochastic crop insurance indemnities were calculated for all crop 
insurance coverage options and coverage levels, and a no insurance option, for both non-
treated and treated scenarios. 
 The stochastic indemnities were simulated, and the overall results show that 
treatment scenarios consistently have lower indemnities than non-treated scenarios 
(Table 6).  The probability of having an indemnity is also lower for treatment scenarios 
than non-treated scenarios.  Lower indemnities for treatment options are attributed to 
lower and less frequent QAFs (Table 6).  Atoxigenics reduce aflatoxin contamination, 
which directly lower QAFs.  Lower QAFs trigger less indemnity payments.  Table 6 
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shows the RP indemnities for all coverage scenarios.  Table 7 shows the probabilities of 
receiving an indemnity for all RP coverage options. 
 
 
Table 6 Indemnities for Revenue Protection Insurance Coverages in $/Acre 
 BENR85 BENR80 BENR75 BENR70 BENR65 BENR60 BENR55 BENR50 
Avg 48.66 41.88 35.64 29.96 25.18 20.68 16.89 13.84 
StD 70.50 65.62 60.80 56.07 51.28 46.79 42.46 38.26 
CV 145 157 171 187 204 226 251 276 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 239.87 225.76 211.65 197.54 183.43 169.32 155.21 141.10 
P(0) 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.81 
         
 BETR85 BETR80 BETR75 BETR70 BETR65 BETR60 BETR55 BETR50 
Avg 24.84 19.55 14.84 10.73 7.86 5.39 3.29 1.84 
StD 39.55 34.23 29.13 24.38 19.68 15.26 11.38 8.18 
CV 159 175 196 227 250 283 346 446 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 147.99 133.86 119.73 105.60 91.47 77.34 63.21 49.08 
P(0) 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.75 0.82 0.83 0.87 0.93 
         
 
CBENR 
85 
CBENR 
80 
CBENR 
75 
CBENR 
70 
CBENR 
65 
CBENR
60 
CBENR
55 
CBENR 
50 
Avg 87.83 75.51 63.98 53.20 43.22 33.77 25.45 18.52 
StD 49.04 47.80 45.53 42.51 38.87 35.13 30.91 26.25 
CV 56 63 71 80 90 104 121 142 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 174.08 161.02 147.96 134.90 121.84 108.78 95.72 82.66 
P(0) 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.41 0.52 
 
 
CBETR 
85 
CBETR 
80 
CBETR 
75 
CBETR 
70 
CBETR 
65 
CBETR 
60 
CBETR 
55 
CBET
R 50 
Avg 71.52 60.80 50.78 41.20 32.45 24.91 18.62 13.48 
StD 51.66 48.58 44.96 41.25 37.23 32.73 27.91 22.93 
CV 72 80 89 100 115 131 150 170 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 167.23 154.17 141.11 128.05 114.99 101.93 88.87 75.81 
P(0) 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.38 0.46 0.58 0.63 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
EPENR 
85 
EPENR 
80 
EPENR 
75 
EPENR 
70 
EPENR 
65 
EPENR 
60 
EPENR 
55 
EPENR   
50 
Avg 84.00 63.74 45.82 30.64 19.76 12.49 7.15 3.33 
StD 55.20 52.26 47.42 41.32 33.66 25.60 17.98 11.64 
CV 66 82 104 135 170 205 252 350 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 230.93 208.50 186.07 163.64 141.21 118.78 96.35 73.92 
P(0) 0.08 0.13 0.26 0.44 0.57 0.74 0.78 0.87 
         
 
EPETR 
85 
EPETR 
80 
EPETR 
75 
EPETR 
70 
EPETR 
65 
EPETR 
60 
EPETR 
55 
EPETR 
50 
Avg 50.01 35.01 23.96 16.05 10.32 5.71 2.72 1.11 
StD 53.38 47.22 39.56 31.57 23.67 16.73 11.03 6.90 
CV 107 135 165 197 229 293 406 622 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 209.45 187.02 164.59 142.16 119.73 97.30 74.87 52.44 
P(0) 0.27 0.44 0.56 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.90 0.97 
         
 
LVENR 
85 
LVENR 
80 
LVENR 
75 
LVENR 
70 
LVENR 
65 
LVENR
60 
LVENR
55 
LVEN
R 50 
Avg 133.24 
57709.7
7 
48799.8
1 
40192.5
0 
32121.40 
24546.5
2 
17640.72 
12182.4
2 
StD 49.25 
24622.6
8 
24622.6
8 
24083.4
0 
22803.38 
21096.1
2 
19015.32 
16154.6
5 
CV 37 43 50 60 71 86 108 133 
Min 39.00 
10591.9
6 
1682.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 235.54 
108860.
61 
99950.6
5 
91040.7
0 
82130.74 
73220.7
9 
64310.83 
55400.8
8 
P(0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.29 0.48 
 
 
LVETR 
85 
LVETR 
80 
LVETR 
75 
LVETR 
70 
LVETR 
65 
LVETR
60 
LVETR
55 
LVET
R 50 
Avg 109.00 91.87 75.67 60.31 46.01 33.59 23.93 16.50 
StD 56.28 55.05 52.54 49.28 45.35 40.44 34.21 27.51 
CV 52 60 69 82 99 120 143 167 
Min 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 225.91 208.09 190.27 172.45 154.63 136.81 118.99 101.17 
P(0) 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.41 0.50 0.62 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
SCENR 
85 
SCENR 
80 
SCENR 
75 
SCENR 
70 
SCENR 
65 
SCENR 
60 
SCENR 
55 
SCENR 
50 
Avg 54.96 44.62 34.99 26.32 18.76 12.56 8.49 5.24 
StD 47.98 43.37 38.59 33.58 28.51 23.54 18.31 13.51 
CV 87 97 110 128 152 187 216 258 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 157.07 142.49 127.91 113.33 98.76 84.18 69.60 55.02 
P(0) 0.26 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.53 0.63 0.75 0.81 
      
 
SCETR 
85 
SCETR 
80 
SCETR 
75 
SCETR 
70 
SCETR 
65 
SCETR 
60 
SCETR 
55 
SCETR     
50 
Avg 41.94 
16501.4
1 
12459.9
2 
8945.44 6209.08 4311.67 2756.53 1598.61 
StD 44.54 
19760.7
0 
17235.1
3 
14725.9
3 
12211.91 9620.10 7250.77 5133.03 
CV 106 120 138 165 197 223 263 321 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 146.98 
66202.5
7 
58913.4
8 
51624.3
8 
44335.29 
37046.2
0 
29757.11 
22468.0
2 
P(0) 0.35 0.41 0.48 0.56 0.72 0.75 0.82 0.87 
         
 
STENR 
85 
STENR 
80 
STENR 
75 
STENR 
70 
STENR 
65 
STENR 
60 
STENR 
55 
STENR  
50 
Avg 87.66 75.06 62.77 51.15 40.55 31.08 23.59 17.07 
StD 47.30 45.72 43.87 41.37 38.02 34.07 28.88 23.49 
CV 54 61 70 81 94 110 122 138 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 176.66 163.16 149.65 136.15 122.65 109.14 95.64 82.13 
P(0) 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.38 0.49 0.55 
         
 
STETR 
85 
STETR 
80 
STETR 
75 
STETR 
70 
STETR 
65 
STETR 
60 
STETR 
55 
STETR  
50 
Avg 58.55 48.13 38.85 31.24 24.46 18.33 12.71 8.18 
StD 50.07 46.67 42.59 37.45 32.07 26.70 21.66 16.84 
CV 86 97 110 120 131 146 170 206 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 163.43 149.93 136.43 122.92 109.42 95.91 82.41 68.91 
P(0) 0.21 0.25 0.38 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.61 0.71 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
UCENR
85 
UCENR
80 
UCENR
75 
UCENR
70 
UCENR
65 
UCENR
60 
UCENR
55 
UCEN
R 50 
Avg 49.07 40.90 33.60 27.36 22.50 18.23 14.75 12.02 
StD 70.35 65.67 61.01 56.36 51.57 47.04 42.73 38.62 
CV 143 161 182 206 229 258 290 321 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 259.16 243.92 228.67 213.43 198.18 182.94 167.69 152.45 
P(0) 0.45 0.48 0.55 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.80 0.84 
         
 
UCETR
85 
UCETR
80 
UCETR
75 
UCETR
70 
UCETR
65 
UCETR
60 
UCETR
55 
UCET
R 50 
Avg 23.66 17.31 12.09 7.86 5.26 3.21 1.75 0.58 
StD 35.37 29.80 24.41 19.50 14.73 10.28 6.20 2.49 
CV 149 172 202 248 280 320 354 431 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 133.11 117.86 102.62 87.37 72.13 56.88 41.64 26.40 
P(0) 0.56 0.61 0.68 0.80 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.93 
      
 
NHENR
85 
NHENR
80 
NHENR
75 
NHENR
70 
NHENR
65 
NHENR
60 
NHENR
55 
NHEN
R 50 
Avg 103.10 69.50 41.99 24.25 14.61 10.20 7.06 4.49 
StD 76.55 72.90 65.83 55.82 45.81 36.05 26.83 18.02 
CV 74 105 157 230 314 353 380 402 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 344.76 307.82 270.89 233.95 197.02 160.08 123.15 86.21 
P(0) 0.03 0.14 0.40 0.65 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.93 
         
 
NHETR
85 
NHETR
80 
NHETR
75 
NHETR
70 
NHETR
65 
NHETR
60 
NHETR
55 
NHET
R 50 
Avg 44.86 27.71 17.51 12.74 9.30 6.54 4.12 1.96 
StD 73.89 63.79 53.80 43.91 34.56 25.57 16.94 8.75 
CV 165 230 307 345 371 391 411 446 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 304.31 267.37 230.44 193.50 156.57 119.63 82.70 45.76 
P(0) 0.41 0.65 0.81 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 
         
         
         
         
         
         
   
60 
Table 6 Continued 
 
SHENR 
85 
SHENR 
80 
SHENR 
75 
SHENR 
70 
SHENR 
65 
SHENR
60 
SHENR
55 
SHEN
R 50 
Avg 76.50 55.23 37.84 26.00 16.78 9.61 5.04 2.48 
StD 63.22 58.32 51.32 41.76 32.21 23.63 15.84 8.92 
CV 83 106 136 161 192 246 314 359 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 223.07 197.15 171.24 145.32 119.40 93.48 67.56 41.64 
P(0) 0.10 0.24 0.48 0.59 0.67 0.80 0.86 0.92 
     
 
SHETR 
85 
SHETR 
80 
SHETR 
75 
SHETR 
70 
SHETR 
65 
SHETR 
60 
SHETR 
55 
SHETR    
50 
Mean 41.35 29.72 20.41 12.58 7.52 4.15 1.95 0.34 
StDev 57.33 47.73 38.11 29.43 21.25 14.07 7.42 1.71 
CV 139 161 187 234 283 339 381 503 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 192.00 166.08 140.16 114.24 88.32 62.40 36.48 10.56 
P(0) 0.50 0.59 0.67 0.76 0.83 0.91 0.92 0.96 
B = Blacklands, CB = Coastal Bend, EP = Edwards Plateau, LV = Lower Valley, SC = South Central,   ST 
= South Texas, UC = Upper Coast, NH = Northern High Plains, SH = Southern High Plains                                                    
E = Enterprise, N = non-treated, T = treated, R = Revenue Protection 
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Table 6 shows that indemnities are higher for non-treated fields than treated 
fields.  Aflatoxin contamination can be a cause of yield loss if the contamination is high 
enough.  Table 6 shows the simulated average indemnity for non-treated revenue 
protection at 85% in the Blacklands (BENR85) to be $48.66/acre. Whereas the treated 
indemnity for the same coverage is $24.84.  The difference is $23.82, meaning the non-
treated scenario received $23.82 more than the treated scenario with the same coverage 
(Table 6).  The indemnity for the Coastal Bend non-treated revenue protection with 85% 
coverage scenario was $16.31 higher than the treated scenario with the same coverage 
(Table 6).  The indemnity for the Edwards Plateau non-treated revenue protection with 
85% coverage scenario was $33.99 higher than the treated scenario with the same 
coverage level (Table 6).  The indemnity for the Lower Valley non-treated revenue 
protection with 85% coverage scenario was $24.24 higher than the treated scenario with 
the same coverage level (Table 6).  The indemnity for the South Central non-treated 
revenue protection with 85% coverage scenario was $13.02 higher than the treated 
scenario with the same coverage level (Table 6).  The indemnity for the South Texas 
non-treated revenue protection with 85% coverage scenario was $29.11 higher than the 
treated scenario with the same coverage level (Table 6).  The indemnity for the Upper 
Coast non-treated revenue protection with 85% coverage scenario was $25.41 higher 
than the treated scenario with the same coverage level (Table 6).  The indemnity for the 
Northern High Plains non-treated revenue protection with 85% coverage scenario was 
$58.24 higher than the treated scenario with the same coverage level (Table 6).  The 
indemnity for the Southern High Plains non-treated revenue protection with 85% 
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coverage scenario was 35.15 higher than the treated scenario with the same coverage 
level (Table 6).  For all scenarios of every district, indemnities were higher for non-
treated scenarios than for treated scenarios, meaning that federal crop insurance costs 
increase on non-treated fields over treated fields. 
 
Table 7 Probability of Indemnity Occurring for RP Insurance 
BENR85 BENR80 BENR75 BENR70 BENR65 BENR60 BENR55 BENR50 
0.51 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.17 
        
BETR85 BETR80 BETR75 BETR70 BETR65 BETR60 BETR55 BETR50 
0.39 0.36 0.31 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.07 
        
CBENR85 CBENR80 CBENR75 CBENR70 CBENR65 CBENR60 CBENR55 CBENR50 
0.97 0.91 0.86 0.79 0.74 0.69 0.59 0.48 
        
CBETR85 CBETR80 CBETR75 CBETR70 CBETR65 CBETR60 CBETR55 CBETR50 
0.85 0.79 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.54 0.42 0.37 
        
EPENR85 EPENR80 EPENR75 EPENR70 EPENR65 EPENR60 EPENR55 EPENR50 
0.92 0.87 0.74 0.56 0.42 0.26 0.22 0.13 
        
EPETR85 EPETR80 EPETR75 EPETR70 EPETR65 EPETR60 EPETR55 EPETR50 
0.73 0.56 0.44 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.03 
        
LVENR85 LVENR80 LVENR75 LVENR70 LVENR65 LVENR60 LVENR55 LVENR50 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.82 0.71 0.52 
        
LVETR85 LVETR80 LVETR75 LVETR70 LVETR65 LVETR60 LVETR55 LVETR50 
1.00 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.58 0.50 0.38 
        
SCENR85 SCENR80 SCENR75 SCENR70 SCENR65 SCENR60 SCENR55 SCENR50 
0.74 0.69 0.62 0.56 0.47 0.37 0.25 0.19 
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Table 7 Continued 
SCETR85 SCETR80 SCETR75 SCETR70 SCETR65 SCETR60 SCETR55 SCETR50 
0.65 0.59 0.51 0.44 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.13 
        
STENR85 STENR80 STENR75 STENR70 STENR65 STENR60 STENR55 STENR50 
0.94 0.93 0.89 0.82 0.76 0.62 0.51 0.45 
        
STETR85 STETR80 STETR75 STETR70 STETR65 STETR60 STETR55 STETR50 
0.79 0.75 0.62 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.39 0.29 
        
UCENR85 UCENR80 UCENR75 UCENR70 UCENR65 UCENR60 UCENR55 UCENR50 
0.57 0.52 0.45 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.16 
        
UCETR85 UCETR80 UCETR75 UCETR70 UCETR65 UCETR60 UCETR55 UCETR50 
0.44 0.39 0.33 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.07 
        
NHPENR 
85 
NHPENR 
80 
NHPENR 
75 
NHPENR 
70 
NHPENR 
65 
NHPENR 
60 
NHPENR 
55 
NHPENR 
50 
0.97 0.86 0.60 0.35 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.06 
        
NHPETR 
85 
NHPETR 
80 
NHPETR 
75 
NHPETR 
70 
NHPETR 
65 
NHPETR 
60 
NHPETR 
55 
NHPETR 
50 
0.59 0.35 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 
        
SHPENR 
85 
SHPENR 
80 
SHPENR 
75 
SHPENR 
70 
SHPENR 
65 
SHPENR 
60 
SHPENR 
55 
SHPENR 
50 
0.90 0.77 0.52 0.41 0.33 0.20 0.14 0.08 
        
SHPETR 
85 
SHPETR 
80 
SHPETR 
75 
SHPETR 
70 
SHPETR 
65 
SHPETR 
60 
SHPETR 
55 
SHPETR 
50 
0.50 0.41 0.33 0.24 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.05 
B = Blacklands, CB = Coastal Bend, EP = Edwards Plateau, LV = Lower Valley, SC = South Central,   ST 
= South Texas, UC = Upper Coast, NH = Northern High Plains, SH = Southern High Plains                                                     
E = Enterprise, N = non-treated, T = treated, R = Revenue Protection 
 
  
 The probability of having an indemnity is higher for non-treated scenarios than 
treated scenarios.  Aflatoxin levels are higher in non-treated scenarios, thus increasing 
the probability of having losses from aflatoxin contamination.  Table 7 shows the 
probability of having an indemnity in the Blacklands district for non-treated revenue 
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protection with 85% coverage is 12% higher than treated scenarios with the same 
insurance coverage.  The probability of having an indemnity in the Coastal Bend district 
for non-treated revenue protection with 85% coverage is 12% higher than treated 
scenarios with the same treated scenarios, given the same insurance coverage (Table 7).  
The probability of having an indemnity in the Edwards Plateau district for non-treated 
revenue protection with 85% coverage is 19% higher than treated scenarios with the 
same treated scenarios, given the same insurance coverage (Table 7).  The probability of 
having an indemnity in the Lower Valley district for non-treated revenue protection with 
85% coverage is the same as treated scenarios with the same treated scenarios, given the 
same insurance coverage (Table 7), however all other non-treated coverage scenarios 
have a higher probability of having an indemnity than treated scenarios with the same 
coverage levels.  The probability of having an indemnity in the South Central district for 
non-treated revenue protection with 85% coverage is 8% higher than treated scenarios 
with the same treated scenarios, given the same insurance coverage (Table 7).  The 
probability of having an indemnity in the South Texas district for non-treated revenue 
protection with 85% coverage is 15% higher than treated scenarios with the same treated 
scenarios, given the same insurance coverage (Table 7).  The probability of having an 
indemnity in the Upper Coast district for non-treated revenue protection with 85% 
coverage is 13% higher than treated scenarios with the same treated scenarios, given the 
same insurance coverage (Table 7).  The probability of having an indemnity in the 
Northern High Plains district for non-treated revenue protection with 85% coverage is 
38% higher than treated scenarios with the same treated scenarios, given the same 
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insurance coverage (Table 7).  The probability of having an indemnity in the Southern 
High Plains district for non-treated revenue protection with 85% coverage is 40% higher 
than treated scenarios with the same treated scenarios, given the same insurance 
coverage (Table 7).  The Edwards Plateau, Northern High Plains, and Southern High 
Plains have the greatest difference between probabilities of having an indemnity between 
non-treated and treated scenarios because those regions have higher yields.  
Next, the simulated indemnities were compared to RMA premiums for crop 
insurance.  The method compares the inflow and outflow of having crop insurance.  
RMA premiums listed in Table 8 are from the USDA’s Quick Estimator tool, for corn in 
each respective district.  The premiums were for one acre, the projected price for each 
district, and 100% price coverage.  RMA subsidizes a certain percentage of the actual 
premium.   The producer pays the remaining balance after the RMA subsidy.  The 
amount the producer pays was used for this study.   
 Crop insurance uses the same premiums for both treated and non-treated 
scenarios.  For example, RP coverage of 70% for a treated field is the same premium as 
a RP 70% non-treated field.  For example, BENR85 and BETR85 both have a premium 
of $29.05/acre (Table 8) even though the probability and mean indemnity for BENR85 is 
higher than BETR85 (Tables 6 and 7).  The results from Table 6 show the non-treated 
scenarios consistently receive higher indemnities than treated scenarios.  Because the 
premiums are the same, non-treated scenarios receive considerably more money from 
crop insurance than do treated scenarios (Table 8).  Table 8 shows the difference 
between RP indemnities received and premiums paid in each district. 
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Table 8 Differences Between Mean Indemnities and RMA Premiums for RP 
Insurance ($/Acre) 
 Non Treat 
BENR 
85 
BENR 
80 
BENR 
75 
BENR 
70 
BENR 
65 
BENR 
60 
BENR 
55 
BETR 
50 
Indemnity 48.66 41.88 35.64 29.96 25.18 20.68 16.89 13.84 
Premium 29.05 16.55 9.05 6.40 5.18 4.20 3.46 2.86 
Difference 19.62 25.33 26.59 23.56 20.00 16.49 13.43 10.98 
         
 Treat 
BETR 
85 
BETR 
80 
BETR 
75 
BETR 
70 
BETR 
65 
BETR 
60 
BETR       
55 
BETR 
50 
Indemnity 24.84 19.55 14.84 10.73 7.86 5.39 3.29 1.84 
Premium 29.05 16.55 9.05 6.40 5.18 4.20 3.46 2.86 
Difference -4.21 3.00 5.79 4.33 2.68 1.19 -0.17 -1.03 
         
 Non-Treat 
CBENR 
85 
CBENR 
80 
CBENR 
75 
CBENR 
70 
CBENR 
65 
CBENR 
60 
CBENR    
55 
CBNR 
50 
Indemnity 87.83 75.51 63.98 53.20 43.22 33.77 25.45 18.52 
Premium 36.90 21.79 13.47 10.02 8.49 7.14 5.94 4.94 
Difference 50.93 53.72 50.50 43.18 34.73 26.63 19.52 13.57 
         
 Treat 
CBETR 
85 
CBETR 
80 
CBETR 
75 
CBETR 
70 
CBETR 
65 
CBETR 
60 
CBETR 
55 
CBER 
50 
Indemnity 71.52 60.80 50.78 41.20 32.45 24.91 18.62 13.48 
Premium 36.90 21.79 13.47 10.02 8.49 7.14 5.94 4.94 
Difference 34.62 39.01 37.31 31.18 23.95 17.78 12.68 8.54 
         
 Non-Treat 
EPENR
85 
EPENR
80 
EPENR
75 
EPENR
70 
EPENR
65 
EPENR
60 
EPENR      
55 
EPENR
50 
Indemnity 84.00 63.74 45.82 30.64 19.76 12.49 7.15 3.33 
Premium 27.54 15.62 9.30 6.62 5.37 4.28 3.43 2.73 
Difference 56.47 48.11 36.52 24.01 14.39 8.21 3.72 0.60 
         
 Treat 
EPETR 
85 
EPETR
80 
EPETR 
75 
EPETR 
70 
EPETR 
65 
EPETR 
60 
EPETR      
55 
EPETR5
0 
Indemnity 50.01 35.01 23.96 16.05 10.32 5.71 2.72 1.11 
Premium 27.54 15.62 9.30 6.62 5.37 4.28 3.43 2.73 
Difference 22.48 19.39 14.67 9.43 4.95 1.43 -0.71 -1.62 
         
 Non-Treat 
LVENR
85 
LVNR8
0 
LVENR
75 
LVENR
70 
LVENR
65 
LVENR
60 
LVENR    
55 
LVNR 
50 
Indemnity 133.2 115.4 97.60 80.39 64.24 49.09 35.28 24.36 
Premium 96.48 57.18 35.55 26.56 22.59 19.05 15.91 13.15 
Difference 36.76 58.24 62.05 53.82 41.65 30.05 19.37 11.22 
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Table 8 Continued 
 Treat 
LVETR
85 
LVETR
80 
LVETR
75 
LVETR
70 
LVETR
65 
LVETR
60 
LVETR    
55 
LVTR 
50  
Indemnity 109.0 91.87 75.67 60.31 46.01 33.59 23.93 16.50 
Premium 96.48 57.18 35.55 26.56 22.59 19.05 15.91 13.15 
Difference 12.52 34.69 40.12 33.75 23.41 14.55 8.03 3.36 
         
 Non-Treat 
SCENR 
85 
SCENR 
80 
SCENR 
75 
SCENR 
70 
SCENR 
65 
SCENR 
60 
SCENR 
55 
SCENR    
50 
Indemnity 54.96 44.62 34.99 26.32 18.76 12.56 8.49 5.24 
Premium 30.61 18.01 11.14 8.25 7.00 5.87 4.88 4.15 
Difference 24.35 26.61 23.85 18.07 11.76 6.69 3.61 1.09 
         
 Treat 
SCETR 
85 
SCETR
80 
SCETR 
75 
SCETR 
70 
SCETR 
65 
SCETR 
60 
SCETR 
55 
SCETR   
50 
Indemnity 41.94 33.00 24.92 17.89 12.42 8.62 5.51 3.20 
Premium 30.61 18.01 11.14 8.25 7.00 5.87 4.88 4.15 
Difference 11.33 14.99 13.78 9.64 5.42 2.76 0.63 -0.95 
         
 Non-Treat 
STENR 
85 
STENR 
80 
STENR
75 
STENR
70 
STENR
65 
STENR
60 
STENR 
55 
STENR  
50 
Indemnity 87.66 75.06 62.77 51.15 40.55 31.08 23.59 17.07 
Premium 28.02 16.25 9.88 7.24 6.09 5.08 4.32 3.68 
Difference 59.64 58.81 52.88 43.90 34.46 26.00 19.27 13.40 
         
 Treat 
STETR 
85 
STETR 
80 
STETR
75 
STETR
70 
STETR
65 
STETR
60 
STETR 
55 
STETR  
50 
Indemnity 58.55 48.13 38.85 31.24 24.46 18.33 12.71 8.18 
Premium 28.02 16.25 9.88 7.24 6.09 5.08 4.32 3.68 
Difference 30.52 31.88 28.97 24.00 18.37 13.25 8.39 4.51 
 
 
 
 
       
 Non-Treat 
UCENR 
85 
UCEN
R 80 
UCEN
R 75 
UCENR 
70 
UCENR 
65  
UCEN
R 60 
UCENR  
55 
UCENR  
50 
Indemnity 49.07 40.90 33.60 27.36 22.50 18.23 14.75 12.02 
Premium 27.03 15.36 8.38 5.99 4.88 4.01 3.33 2.76 
Difference 22.04 25.54 25.22 21.37 17.62 14.22 11.43 9.26 
          
 Treat UCTR85 UCTR80 UCTR75 UCTR70 UCTR65 UCTR60 UCTR55 UCTR50 
Indemnity 23.66 17.31 12.09 7.86 5.26 3.21 1.75 0.58 
Premium 27.03 15.36 8.38 5.99 4.88 4.01 3.33 2.76 
Difference -3.37 1.95 3.71 1.86 0.39 -0.80 -1.57 -2.18 
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Table 8 Continued 
 Non-Treat NHNR85 NHNR80 NHNR75 NHNR70 NHNR65 NHNR60 NHNR55 NHNR50 
Indemnity 103.10 69.50 41.99 24.25 14.61 10.20 7.06 4.49 
Premium 20.62 11.08 6.21 3.89 2.69 1.88 1.35 0.98 
Difference 82.48 58.43 35.78 20.35 11.92 8.32 5.71 3.51 
         
 Treat NHTR85 NHTR80 NHTR75 NHTR70 NHTR65 NHTR60 NHTR55 NHTR50 
Indemnity 44.86 27.71 17.51 12.74 9.30 6.54 4.12 1.96 
Premium 20.62 11.08 6.21 3.89 2.69 1.88 1.35 0.98 
Difference 24.24 16.63 11.30 8.85 6.62 4.66 2.77 0.99 
         
 Non-Treat SHNR85 SHNR80 SHNR75 SHNR70 SHNR65 SHNR60 SHNR55 SHNR50 
Indemnity 76.50 55.23 37.84 26.00 16.78 9.61 5.04 2.48 
Premium 18.38 9.85 5.60 3.79 2.88 2.09 1.52 1.11 
Difference 58.12 45.38 32.24 22.21 13.90 7.53 3.52 1.38 
         
 Treat SHTR85 SHTR80 SHTR75 SHTR70 SHTR65 SHTR60 SHTR55 SHTR50 
Indemnity 41.35 29.72 20.41 12.58 7.52 4.15 1.95 0.34 
Premium 18.38 9.85 5.60 3.79 2.88 2.09 1.52 1.11 
Difference 22.97 19.87 14.80 8.79 4.64 2.07 0.43 -0.77 
B = Blacklands, CB = Coastal Bend, EP = Edwards Plateau, LV = Lower Valley, SC = South Central,   ST 
= South Texas, UC = Upper Coast, NH = Northern High Plains, SH = Southern High Plains 
E = Enterprise, N = non-treated, T = treated, R = Revenue Protection 
 
 
 
 Table 8 shows producers who purchase insurance and do not use atoxigenics 
were more likely to receive higher average net indemnities than producers who do treat 
with atoxigenics.  Table 8 shows the difference between RP indemnities and RMA 
premiums for all coverage scenarios in the districts.  In the Blacklands district, the 
difference between the non-treated average RP indemnity at 85% coverage and the RMA 
premium was $23.83/acre higher than the treated scenario with the same coverage (Table 
8).  In this coverage (BETR85), the difference between indemnity and premium is 
negative (-$4.21/acre).  In the Coastal Bend district, the difference between the non-
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treated average RP indemnity at 85% coverage and the RMA premium was $16.31/acre 
higher than the treated scenario with the same coverage (Table 8).  In the Edwards 
Plateau district, the difference between the non-treated average RP indemnity at 85% 
coverage and the RMA premium was $33.99/acre higher than the treated scenario with 
the same coverage (Table 8).  In the Lower Valley district, the difference between the 
non-treated average RP indemnity at 85% coverage and the RMA premium was 
$24.24/acre higher than the treated scenario with the same coverage (Table 8).  In the 
South Central district, the difference between the non-treated average RP indemnity at 
85% coverage and the RMA premium was $13.02/acre higher than the treated scenario 
with the same coverage (Table 8).  In the South Texas district, the difference between 
the non-treated average RP indemnity at 85% coverage and the RMA premium was 
$29.11/acre higher than the treated scenario with the same coverage (Table 8).  In the 
Upper Coast district, the difference between the non-treated average RP indemnity at 
85% coverage and the RMA premium was $25.41/acre higher than the treated scenario 
with the same coverage (Table 8).  In the Northern High Plains district, the difference 
between the non-treated average RP indemnity at 85% coverage and the RMA premium 
was $58.24/acre higher than the treated scenario with the same coverage (Table 8).  In 
the Southern High Plains district, the difference between the non-treated average RP 
indemnity at 85% coverage and the RMA premium was $35.15/acre higher than the 
treated scenario with the same coverage (Table 8).  When looking at a one year budget, 
there is a risk that crop insurance will cover losses from aflatoxin more effectively than 
atoxigenics, but a partial budget simulation is needed to answer this question.  However, 
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the argument could be made that producers who apply atoxigenics to their corn should 
receive a lower premium than a producer who does not use atoxigenics for aflatoxin 
control.  
 
6.4 Stochastic Partial Budget Analysis 
 Stochastic market revenue and insurance indemnities were simulated for each 
agricultural district using stochastic yield, market price, and aflatoxin contamination 
variables. Atoxigenic and aerial application costs were added for all treatment scenarios.  
Gross revenue consisted of total market revenue and insurance indemnities, and cost 
included a partial budget for cost of production, the atoxigenic and aerial costs for all 
treatment scenarios, and varying insurance premiums for the different insurance 
coverage options and coverage levels.  Stochastic net incomes were simulated for each 
insurance option under the non-treated and treated scenarios.  
  The partial budget net incomes were simulated for 882 options across all 
districts and insurance combinations.  The options included: 9 districts * 3 coverage 
options * 8 coverage levels * 2 (non-treated or treated) * 2 (enterprise or optional) + 
(2*9) (non-insured non-treated and non-insured treated for 9 districts).  Table 9 shows 
the summary statistics of the net-incomes for non-insured options for both non-treated 
and treated scenarios by district.   
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Table 9 Net Incomes for Non-Insured Scenarios for all Districts ($/Acre) 
Variable BL NT BL T CB NT CB T EP NT EP T 
Mean  -57.92 -27.74 -109.55 -91.19 106.21 148.76 
StDev  98.88 114.72 83.26 95.83 105.59 117.29 
CV -170.72 -413.49 -76.00 -105.08 99.42 78.84 
Min  -259.25 -253.39 -265.70 -266.10 -135.69 -140.98 
Max  245.44 322.79 129.63 238.66 447.62 514.29 
       
 LV NT LV T SC NT SC T ST NT ST T 
Mean  26.72 53.11 -8.81 26.35 -20.10 -9.80 
StDev  92.31 104.75 93.79 108.68 79.27 87.11 
CV 345.54 197.22 -1064.23 412.42 -394.43 -888.58 
Min  -176.59 -160.88 -213.41 -207.06 -170.36 -184.26 
Max  284.88 341.25 256.53 315.10 252.35 277.00 
       
 UP NT UP T 
NHP 
NT NHP T SHP NT SHP T 
Mean  -10.53 18.29 122.93 118.91 -181.78 -189.23 
StDev  118.13 131.04 150.35 152.57 118.63 120.50 
CV -1121.51 716.34 122.30 128.31 -65.26 -63.68 
Min  -222.97 -223.22 -285.91 -297.15 -472.19 -483.62 
Max  473.98 507.07 532.63 539.59 142.34 148.98 
 
  
 
 The net incomes of non-insured non-treated and treated scenarios could have 
were positive or negative depending on the Texas A&M Agrilife Extension corn budget 
for the districts.  For the purposes of this study, only the differences between non-treated 
and treated net incomes are analyzed.  Table 9 shows that seven of the nine districts have 
higher non-insured treated average net incomes than non-insured not treated average net 
incomes.  In the Blacklands district, the average difference between the non-insured 
treated and non-insured not treated scenarios was $30.18/acre (Table 9).  In the Coastal 
Bend district, the average difference between the non-insured treated and non-insured 
not treated scenarios was $18.36/acre (Table 9).  In the Edwards Plateau district, the 
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average difference between the non-insured treated and non-insured not treated scenarios 
was $42.55/acre (Table 9).  In the Lower Valley district, the average difference between 
the non-insured treated and non-insured not treated scenarios was $26.40/acre (Table 9).  
In the South Central district, the average difference between the non-insured treated and 
non-insured not treated scenarios was $35.17/acre (Table 9).  In the South Texas district, 
the average difference between the non-insured treated and non-insured not treated 
scenarios was $10.29/acre (Table 9).  In the Upper Coast district, the average difference 
between the non-insured treated and non-insured not treated scenarios was $28.83/acre 
(Table 9).  In the Northern High Plains district, the average difference between the non-
insured treated and non-insured not treated scenarios was -$4.02/acre (Table 9).  In the 
Southern High Plains district, the average difference between the non-insured treated 
and non-insured not treated scenarios was -$7.45/acre (Table 9).   
Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the StopLight analysis for the respective favorable, 
cautionary, and unfavorable net income results for all 500 acres, between the ranges of 
$0 to $25,000 for the non-insured options.  The StopLight analysis charts are visual 
representations of probabilities.  The green bar represents the favorable probability of the 
net income exceeding $25,000. The yellow bar represents the cautionary probability of 
net income between zero and $25,000.  The red bar represents the unfavorable 
probability of the scenario net income failing to reach $0.  
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Figure 6 Stoplight Analysis of Non-Insured Net-Incomes for the Blacklands, 
Coastal Bend, and Edwards Plateau Districts for Probabilities Less than $0 and 
Greater than $25,000 
BL = Blacklands, CB = Coastal Bend, EP = Edwards Plateau 
NT = Not-treated, T = Treated 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7 Analysis of Non-Insured Net-Incomes from the Lower Valley, South 
Central, and South Texas Districts for Probabilities Less than $0 and Greater than 
$25,000 
LV = Lower Valley, SC = South Central, ST = South Texas 
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Figure 8 Stoplight Analysis of Non-Insured Net-Incomes from the Upper Coast, 
Northern High Plains, and Southern High Plains Districts for Probabilities Less 
than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
UP = Upper Coast, NHP = Northern High Plains, SHP = Southern High Plains 
 
 The results of the StopLight Analysis show seven of the nine districts have a 
greater probability of having a positive net income and exceeding $25,000 under the 
treated scenarios (Figures 6, 7, 8).  The Blacklands non-insured scenarios are used as an 
example. The Blacklands non-insured not treated scenario has a 14% favorable 
probability of net income exceeding $25,000, a 16% cautionary probability of net 
income between $0 and $25,000, and a 70% probability of failing to reach $0 (Figure 6).  
The non-insured treated scenario has 28% probability of net income exceeding $25,000, 
a 14% cautionary probability, and a 58% probability of net income failing to exceed $0 
(Figure 6).  The favorable probability of net income exceeding $25,000 is 14% higher 
for the treated scenario, and the probability of net income failing to exceed $0 is 22% 
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lower for the treated scenario.  It can be concluded that for the Blacklands, the non-
insured treated scenario is preferred over the non-insured not treated scenario.    
The Blacklands, Coastal Bend, Edwards Plateau, Lower Valley, South Central, 
South Texas, and Upper Coast have a greater probability of having a net income, for all 
500 acres, greater than $0 and exceeding $25,000 under treatment scenarios than non-
treated scenarios (Figures 6, 7, 8).  The Northern High Plains has a slightly greater 
probability of having net income greater than $0 and exceeding $25,000 under the non-
treated scenario than the treated scenario due to the low probability of aflatoxin 
contamination in the Northern High Plains (Figure 8).  The Southern High Plains is 
indifferent between non-treated and treated scenarios (Figure 8).  This analysis was only 
for non-insured options for non-treated and treated scenarios.  An additional analysis 
was performed to analyze net income of crop insurance options. 
 The net income results that included crop insurance coverages were compared 
within their respective coverage groups first.  Treated YP coverage levels were 
compared to each other, treated RP coverage levels were compared to each other, and 
treated RPHE coverage levels were compared to each other.  The same method was used 
for non-treated options.  Within each district, all 98 scenarios were ranked using SDRF.  
Within each comparison, the top ranked options from the SDRF were ranked by SERF.  
In other words, the top treated YP, treated RP, treated RPHE, non-treated YP, non-
treated RP, and non-treated RPHE and both non-insured treated and non-insured not 
treated were ranked by SERF.  The upper RAC for both SDRF and SERF was calculated 
as four divided by 75% of market place value for 500 acres of farmland in the respective 
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district.  Farmland value was obtained from by from Texas Rural Land Value Trends 
(2013).   
Figure 9 shows the StopLight analysis, of all 500 acres, for the eight best 
scenarios of the Blacklands district, which include BNINT, BENY75, BENR75, 
BENRH75, BNIT, BETY70, BETR75, and BETRH75.  Every crop insurance and non-
insured treated scenario (BNIT, BETY70, BETR75, and BETRH75) had a greater 
probability of net income exceeding $25,000 than the not treated scenario with the same 
coverage option (BNINT, BENY75, BENR75, BENRH75) (Figure 9).  Figure 10 shows 
the SERF rankings of risky options for the Blacklands.  The scenarios ranked by SERF 
for the Blacklands district are TYP 70%, TRP 75%, TRPHE 75%, NTYP 75%, NTRP 
75%, and NTRPHE 75%.  All of the coverage options are under an enterprise policy.  
Non-insured treated and non-treated were concluded for comparison purposes. The 
results suggest that all risk averse decision makers would prefer BETRH75 over the 
other scenarios, regardless of risk aversion level.   
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Figure 9 Stoplight Analysis of Net-Incomes for Blacklands for Probabilities Less 
than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
BNINT = Blacklands non-insured not treated 
BENY75 = Blacklands enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
BENR75 = Blacklands enterprise not treated revenue protection 75% 
BENRH75 = Blacklands enterprise revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 75% 
BNIT = Blacklands non-insured treated 
BETY70 = Blacklands enterprise treated yield protection 70% 
BETR75 = Blacklands enterprise revenue protection 75% 
BETRH75 = Blacklands enterprise revenue protection with harvest exclusion 75% 
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Figure 10 SERF Analysis of Net-Incomes for Blacklands 
BNINT = Blacklands non-insured not treated 
BENY75 = Blacklands enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
BENR75 = Blacklands enterprise not treated revenue protection 75% 
BENRH75 = Blacklands enterprise revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 75% 
BNIT = Blacklands non-insured treated 
BETY70 = Blacklands enterprise treated yield protection 70% 
BETR75 = Blacklands enterprise revenue protection 75% 
BETRH75 = Blacklands enterprise revenue protection with harvest exclusion 75% 
  
 
 
 The top rated risky scenarios for the Coastal Bend district that were ranked first 
by SDRF and then by SERF include CBENRH80, CBENR85, CBENY80, CBNIN, 
CBETRH80, CBETR80, CBETY75, and CBNIT.  Figure 11 shows the StopLight 
analysis of net incomes for the Coastal Bend, and Figure 12 shows the SERF analysis for 
the Coastal Bend district.  The StopLight analysis in Figure 11 shows the treated 
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scenarios (CBETRH80, CBETR80, CBETY75, and CBNIT) had a greater probability of 
having a positive net income and exceeding $25,000 (Figure 11).  For example, the best-
treated scenario CBETRH80 had a 7% greater probability of exceeding $0 than the best 
non-treated scenario CBENRH80.  The top ranked treated scenarios (CBETRH80, 
CBETR80, CBETY75, and CBNIT) were approximately 4% higher than their top ranked 
non-treated counterparts (CBENRH80, CBENR85, CBENY80, CBNIN) (Figure 11).  
The SERF analysis in Figure 12 shows a slight preference for the treated RP and RHPE 
coverage options.  Although the results show that growing corn in the Coastal Bend is 
not a profitable practice at current prices, using atoxigenics for aflatoxin control offers 
financial incentives.  The results indicate that enterprise RPHE insurance option at 80% 
will return the highest net income (Figure 12).  The least favorable scenario, according 
to Figure 12, is the non-insured, non-treated scenario. 
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Figure 11 Stoplight Analysis for Net Incomes of Coastal Bend for Probabilities Less 
than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
CBNINT = Coastal Bend non-insured not treated 
CBNIT = Coastal Bend non-insured treated 
CBENY80 = Coastal Bend enterprise non treated yield protection 80% 
CBETY75 = Coastal Bend enterprise treated yield protection 75% 
CBENR85 = Coastal Bend enterprise non treated revenue protection 85% 
CBETR80 = Coastal Bend enterprise treated revenue protection 80% 
CBENRH80 = Coastal Bend enterprise non treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
CBETRH80 = Coastal Bend enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
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Figure 12 SERF Analysis of Net-Incomes for Coastal Bend 
CBNINT = Coastal Bend non-insured not treated 
CBNIT = Coastal Bend non-insured treated 
CBENY80 = Coastal Bend enterprise non treated yield protection 80% 
CBETY75 = Coastal Bend enterprise treated yield protection 75% 
CBENR85 = Coastal Bend enterprise non treated revenue protection 85% 
CBETR80 = Coastal Bend enterprise treated revenue protection 80% 
CBENRH80 = Coastal Bend enterprise non treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
CBETRH80 = Coastal Bend enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
  
 
The top rated risky scenarios for the Edwards Plateau district that were ranked 
first by SDRF and then by SERF include EPNIN, EPENY75, EPENR85, EPENRH85, 
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EPNIT, EPETY85, EPETR85, and EPETRH85.  Figure 13 shows the StopLight analysis 
of net incomes for Edward Plateau, and Figure 14 shows the SERF analysis for the 
Edwards Plateau.  The StopLight analysis in Figure 13 shows the treated scenarios 
(EPNIT, EPETY85, EPETR85, and EPETRH85) had a greater probability of having a 
positive net income and exceeding $100,000 (Figure 13).  The treated non-insured 
scenario (EPNIT) had 5% higher probability of having a positive net income than the 
non-insured not treated scenario (EPNINT), the treated scenario also had a 14% greater 
probability of reaching or exceeding $100,000 than the non-treated scenario (Figure 13). 
The SERF analysis in Figure 14 shows a preference for the treated RP and RHPE 
options.  The results indicate that using atoxigenics for aflatoxin control in corn is cost 
effective in the Edwards Plateau.  The results indicate that enterprise RPHE insurance 
option at 85% is the most preferred.  Similar to the previous region, the least favorable 
scenario is non-insured, non-treated (Figure 14). 
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Figure 13 Stoplight Analysis for Net-Incomes of Edwards Plateau for Probabilities 
Less than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
EPNINT = Edwards Plateau non-insured not treated 
EPNIT = Edwards Plateau non-insured treated 
EPENY75 = Edwards Plateau enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
EPETY85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise treated yield protection 85% 
EPENR85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise not treated revenue protection 85% 
EPETR85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise treated revenue protection 85% 
EPENRH85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 85% 
EPETRH85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 85% 
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Figure 14 SERF Analysis of Net Incomes for the Edwards Plateau 
EPNINT = Edwards Plateau non-insured not treated 
EPNIT = Edwards Plateau non-insured treated 
EPENY75 = Edwards Plateau enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
EPETY85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise treated yield protection 85% 
EPENR85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise not treated revenue protection 85% 
EPETR85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise treated revenue protection 85% 
EPENRH85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 85% 
EPETRH85 = Edwards Plateau enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 85% 
 
 
The top rated risky scenarios for the Lower Valley that were ranked first by 
SDRF and then by SERF include LVNIN, LVENY70, LVENR75, LVENRH75, LVNIT, 
LVETY70, LVETR75, and LVETRH75.  Figure 15 shows the StopLight analysis of net 
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incomes for the Lower Valley district, and Figure 16 shows the SERF analysis for the 
Lower Valley.  The StopLight analysis in Figure 15 shows the treated scenarios (LVNIT, 
LVETY70, LVETR75, and LVETRH75) had a greater probability of having a positive 
net income and exceeding $50,000.  The treated non-insured scenario (LVNIT) had a 7% 
higher probability of having a positive net income than the non-insured, not treated 
scenario (LVNINT), the treated scenario also had an 11% greater probability of reaching 
or exceeding $50,000 than the non-treated scenario (Figure 15).  The SERF analysis in 
Figure 16 shows a preference to the treated RP and RHPE coverage options.  The results 
indicate that using atoxigenics for aflatoxin control in corn is cost effective in the Lower 
Valley district.  The results indicate that the enterprise RPHE insurance option at 75% 
(LVETRH75) is preferred by all risk averse decision makers.  Similar to the previous 
region, the least favorable scenario is non-insured, non-treated (Figure 16).  If the 
producer decided not to treat or treatments were unavailable, using revenue protection 
with harvest price exclusion would be the best scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
86 
 
Figure 15 Stoplight Analysis of Net-Incomes for the Lower Valley for Probabilities 
Less than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
LVNINT = Lower Valley non-insured not treated 
LVNIT = Lower Valley non-insured treated 
LVENY70 = Lower Valley enterprise not treated yield protection 70% 
LVETY70 = Lower Valley enterprise treated yield protection 70% 
LVENR75 =Lower Valley enterprise not treated revenue protection 75% 
LVETR75 = Lower Valley enterprise treated revenue protection 75% 
LVENRH75 = Lower Valley enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 75% 
LVETRH75 = Lower Valley enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 75%  
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Figure 16 SERF Analysis for Net-Incomes for the Lower Valley 
LVNINT = Lower Valley non-insured not treated 
LVNIT = Lower Valley non-insured treated 
LVENY70 = Lower Valley enterprise not treated yield protection 70% 
LVETY70 = Lower Valley enterprise treated yield protection 70% 
LVENR75 =Lower Valley enterprise not treated revenue protection 75% 
LVETR75 = Lower Valley enterprise treated revenue protection 75% 
LVENRH75 = Lower Valley enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 75% 
LVETRH75 = Lower Valley enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 75% 
 
 
 
The top rated risky scenarios for the South Central district that were ranked first 
by SDRF and then by SERF include SCENIN, SCENIT, SCENY75, SCETY70, 
SCENR80, SCETR80, SCENRH80, and SCETRH80.  Figure 17 shows the StopLight 
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analysis of net incomes for the  South Central, and Figure 18 shows the SERF analysis.  
The StopLight analysis in Figure 17 shows the treated scenarios (SCNIT, SCETR80, 
SCENRH80, and SCETRH80) had a greater probability of having a positive net income 
and exceeding $25,000.  The treated non-insured scenario (SCNIT) had 13% greater 
probability of having a positive net income than the non-insured not treated scenario 
(SCENIN), the treated scenario also had a 12% higher probability of exceeding $25,000 
than the non-treated scenario (Figure 17).  The SERF analysis in Figure 18 shows a 
preference to the treated RP and RHPE coverage options.  The results indicate that using 
atoxigenics for aflatoxin control in corn is cost effective in the South Central district.  
The results indicate that enterprise RPHE insurance option at 80% (SCETRH80) was the 
most preferred scenario. Similar to other regions, the least favorable scenario is non-
insured, non-treated (Figure 18).  A risk neutral producer would view the non-treated 
yield protection scenario as equally or close to as unfavorable as non-insured untreated, 
however as the producer becomes more risk averse, the non-insured untreated scenario is 
the least favorable. 
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Figure 17 Stoplight Analysis of Net-Incomes for South Central for Probabilities 
Less than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
SCNINT = South Central non-insured not treated 
SCNIT = South Central non-insured treated 
SCENY75 = South Central enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
SCETY70 = South Central enterprise treated yield protection 70% 
SCENR80 = South Central enterprise not treated revenue protection 80% 
SCETR80 = South Central enterprise treated revenue protection 80% 
SCENRH80 = South Central enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
SCETRH80 = South Central enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
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Figure 18 SERF Analysis for Net-Incomes for South Central 
SCNINT = South Central non-insured not treated 
SCNIT = South Central non-insured treated 
SCENY75 = South Central enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
SCETY70 = South Central enterprise treated yield protection 70% 
SCENR80 = South Central enterprise not treated revenue protection 80% 
SCETR80 = South Central enterprise treated revenue protection 80% 
SCENRH80 = South Central enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
SCETRH80 = South Central enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
 
 
 
The top rated risky scenarios for South Texas that were ranked first by SDRF and 
then by SERF include STNIN, STNIT, STENY75, STETY75, STENR85, STETR80, 
STENRH85, and STETRH80.  Figure 19 shows the StopLight analysis of net incomes 
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for South Texas, and Figure 20 shows the SERF analysis for South Texas.  The 
StopLight analysis in Figure 19 shows mixed results.  Treated non-insured (STNIT) and 
treated YP (STETY75) both had greater probabilities of having a positive net income 
and a 5% higher probability of exceeding $25,000 than their non-treated counterparts 
(STNINT and STENY75).  However, treated STETR80 and treated STETRH80 both 
have a lower probabilities of having a positive net income and have a 10% to 11% lower 
probability of exceeding $25,000 than their non-treated counterparts (STENR85 and 
STENRH85) (Figure 19).  The SERF analysis in Figure 20 shows preference to the non-
treated RPHE and non-treated RP scenarios.  The certainty equivalent of STENTR85 
and STENTR85 is approximately 8,000 higher than that of STETRH80 and STETR80, 
respectively.  The most preferred scenario for the South Texas district is non-treated 
revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 85 % (STENRH85).  Using atoxigenics 
in the South Texas district is not as cost effective as not treating and purchasing either 
RP or RPHE crop insurance. 
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Figure 19 Stoplight Analysis of Net-Incomes for South Texas for Probabilities Less 
than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
STNINT = South Texas non-insured not treated 
STNIT = South Texas non-insured treated 
STENY75 = South Texas enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
STETY75 = South Texas enterprise treated yield protection 75% 
STENR85 = South Texas enterprise not treated revenue protection 85% 
STETR80 = South Texas enterprise treated revenue protection 80% 
STENRH85 = South Texas enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 85% 
STETRH80 = South Texas enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
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Figure 20 SERF Analysis for Net-Incomes for South Texas 
STNINT = South Texas non-insured not treated 
STNIT = South Texas non-insured treated 
STENY75 = South Texas enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
STETY75 = South Texas enterprise treated yield protection 75% 
STENR85 = South Texas enterprise not treated revenue protection 85% 
STETR80 = South Texas enterprise treated revenue protection 80% 
STENRH85 = South Texas enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 85% 
STETRH80 = South Texas enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
 
 
The top rated risky scenarios for the Upper Coast that were ranked first by SDRF 
and then by SERF include UCNINT, UCENY75, UCENR80, UCENRH80, UCNIT, 
UCETY70, UCETR75, and UCETRH75.  Figure 21 shows the StopLight analysis of net 
incomes for the Upper Coast, and Figure 22 shows the SERF analysis for the Upper 
Coast.  The StopLight analysis in Figure 21 shows the treated scenarios (UCNIT, 
UCETY70, UCETR75, and UCETRH75) had a greater probability of having a positive 
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net income and exceeding $25,000.  The top ranked treated scenarios (UCNIT, 
UCETY70, UCETR75, and UCETRH75) had a 4% to 10% higher probability of 
exceeding $25,000 than their top ranked non-treated counterparts (UPENINT, 
UPENY75, UPENR80, UPENRH80, UPNIT) (Figure 21).  The SERF analysis in Figure 
22 shows a preference to the treated RP and RHPE coverage options.  In the Upper 
Coast district, using atoxigenics for aflatoxin control is cost effective.  The results 
indicate that enterprise RPHE insurance option at 75% (UCETRH75) was the most 
preferred scenario. 
 
 
Figure 21 Stoplight Analysis of Net-Incomes for the Upper Coast for Probabilities 
Less than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
UCNINT = Upper Coast non-insured not treated 
UCNIT = Upper Coast non-insured treated 
UCENY75 = Upper Coast enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
UCETY70 = Upper Coast enterprise treated yield protection 70% 
UCENR80 = Upper Coast enterprise not treated revenue protection 80% 
UCETR70 = Upper Coast enterprise treated revenue protection 70% 
UCENRH80 = Upper Coast enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
UCETRH75 = Upper Coast enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 75% 
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Figure 22 SERF Analysis for Net-Incomes for the Upper Coast 
UCNINT = Upper Coast non-insured not treated 
UCNIT = Upper Coast non-insured treated 
UCENY75 = Upper Coast enterprise not treated yield protection 75% 
UCETY70 = Upper Coast enterprise treated yield protection 70% 
UCENR80 = Upper Coast enterprise not treated revenue protection 80% 
UCETR70 = Upper Coast enterprise treated revenue protection 70% 
UCENRH80 = Upper Coast enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 80% 
UCETRH75 = Upper Coast enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 75% 
 
 
 
The top rated risky scenarios for the Northern High Plains that were ranked first 
by SDRF and then by SERF include NHPNIN, NHPENY85, NHPETY85, NHPENR85, 
NHPETR85, NHPENRH85, NHPETRH85, and NHPNIT.  Figure 23 shows the 
StopLight analysis of net incomes for the Northern High Plains, and Figure 24 shows the 
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SERF analysis for the Northern High Plains.  The StopLight analysis in Figure 23 shows 
that non-treated crop insurance scenarios (NHPNIN, NHPENY85, NHPETY85, 
NHPENR85) have a 5% to 6% higher probability of having a positive net income and 
had a 15% to 22% higher probability of net income exceeding $100,000 than their 
treated counterparts (NHPETR85, NHPENRH85, NHPETRH85, and NHPNIT).  The 
not treated, non-insured scenario (NHPNIN) had a 1% higher probability on both ends 
than the non-insured, treated scenario (NHPNIT) (Figure 23).  The SERF analysis in 
Figure 24 shows preference to non-treated RP (NHPENR85) and non-treated RPHE 
(NHPENRH85) scenarios.  Due to a lack of aflatoxin contamination in the Northern 
High Plains, the use of atoxigenics for aflatoxin control is not cost effective.  The 
reduction of aflatoxin results in fewer and less severe RIVs.  The less frequent and lower 
RIVs translate to increased market revenue for treated fields.  The Northern High Plains 
do not have enough aflatoxin to validate the use of atoxigenics. 
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Figure 23 Stoplight Analysis of Net-Incomes for the Northern High Plains for 
Probabilities Less than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
NHPNINT = Northern High Plains non-insured not treated 
NHPNIT = Northern High Plains non-insured treated 
NHPENY85 = Northern High Plains enterprise not treated yield protection 85% 
NHPETY85 = Northern High Plains enterprise treated yield protection 85% 
NHPENR85 = Northern High Plains enterprise not treated revenue protection 85% 
NHPETR85 = Northern High Plains enterprise treated revenue protection 85% 
NHPENRH85 = Northern High Plains enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price 
exclusion 85% 
NHPETRH85 = Northern High Plains enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 
85% 
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Figure 24 SERF Analysis for Net-Incomes for the Northern High Plains 
NHPNINT = Northern High Plains non-insured not treated 
NHPNIT = Northern High Plains non-insured treated 
NHPENY85 = Northern High Plains enterprise not treated yield protection 85% 
NHPETY85 = Northern High Plains enterprise treated yield protection 85% 
NHPENR85 = Northern High Plains enterprise not treated revenue protection 85% 
NHPETR85 = Northern High Plains enterprise treated revenue protection 85% 
NHPENRH85 = Northern High Plains enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price 
exclusion 85% 
NHPETRH85 = Northern High Plains enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 
85% 
 
 
 
The top rated risky scenarios for the Southern High Plains that were ranked first 
by SDRF and then by SERF include SHPNIN, SHPENY85, SHPETY85, SHPENR85, 
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SHPETR85, SHPENRH85, SHPETRH85, and SHPNIT.  Figure 25 shows the StopLight 
analysis of net incomes for the Southern High Plains, and Figure 26 shows the SERF 
analysis for the Southern High Plains.  The StopLight analysis in Figure 25 shows that 
non-treated crop insurance scenarios (SHPENY85, SHPETY85, SHPENR85) had a 4% 
to 5% higher probability of having a positive net income and had a 1% to 2% higher 
probability of net income exceeding $25,000 than their treated counterparts 
(SHPETR85, SHPENRH85, SHPETRH85).  The not treated, non-insured scenario 
(SHPNINT) has the same probability as the non-insured, treated scenario (SHPNIT) of 
net income exceeding $25,000 (Figure 25).  The SERF analysis in Figure 26 shows 
preference to non-treated RP (SHPENR85) and non-treated RPHE (SHPETRH85) 
scenarios.  The analysis shows that producing corn in the Southern High Plains is very 
unprofitable at the current price and the use of atoxigenics is not cost effective in the 
Southern High Plains.  Although the analysis shows producing corn in this region is not 
profitable, the scope of this study looks at the cost-effectiveness of applying atoxigenics. 
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Figure 25 Stoplight Analysis of Net-Incomes for the Southern High Plains for 
Probabilities Less than $0 and Greater than $25,000 
SHPNINT = Southern High Plains non-insured not treated 
SHPNIT = Southern High Plains non-insured treated 
SHPENY85 = Southern High Plains enterprise not treated yield protection 85% 
SHPETY85 = Southern High Plains enterprise treated yield protection 85% 
SHPENR85 = Southern High Plains enterprise not treated revenue protection 85% 
SHPETR85 = Southern High Plains enterprise treated revenue protection 85% 
SHPENRH85 = Southern High Plains enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price 
exclusion 85% 
SHPETRH85 = Southern High Plains enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 
85% 
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Figure 26 SERF Analysis for Net-Incomes for the Southern High Plains 
SHPNINT = Southern High Plains non-insured not treated 
SHPNIT = Southern High Plains non-insured treated 
SHPENY85 = Southern High Plains enterprise not treated yield protection 85% 
SHPETY85 = Southern High Plains enterprise treated yield protection 85% 
SHPENR85 = Southern High Plains enterprise not treated revenue protection 85% 
SHPETR85 = Southern High Plains enterprise treated revenue protection 85% 
SHPENRH85 = Southern High Plains enterprise not treated revenue protection with harvest price 
exclusion 85% 
SHPETRH85 = Southern High Plains enterprise treated revenue protection with harvest price exclusion 
85% 
 
 
 
6.5 Summary of Results  
 Ignoring crop insurance, the results show seven of the nine agricultural districts 
realized financial benefits for using atoxigenics for aflatoxin control.  The Blacklands, 
Coastal Bend, Edwards Plateau, South Central, South Texas, Lower Valley, and Upper 
Coast districts had financial benefits of $10/acre to $40/acre when using atoxigenics for 
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aflatoxin control.  The Northern High Plains and Southern High Plains did not have 
financial benefits for using atoxigenics due to low probabilities of aflatoxin 
contamination.  The Northern High Plains and Southern High Plains saw losses of $4.07 
and $7.43, respectively, for treated scenarios.   
 The fact that crop insurance premiums are the same for non-treated and treated 
scenarios complicates the decision to use atoxigenics.  Producers who treat pay the same 
premium, but receive lower indemnities than producers who do not treat.  Net income 
simulations for crop insurance scenarios show producers in some districts have financial 
incentives to use atoxigenics while producers in other districts do not.  The results show 
producers in the Blacklands, Coastal Bend, Edwards Plateau, Lower Valley, South 
Central, and Upper Coast districts have financial incentives to use atoxigenics for every 
insurance scenario, whether insured or not.  Producers in the Northern High Plains and 
Southern High Plains have financial incentives not to use atoxigenics.  All scenarios in 
the Northern High Plains and Southern High Plains, whether insured or not have higher 
net returns from not treating.  The results of the South Texas district show the cost 
effectiveness of atoxigenics depends on the type of insurance coverage the producer 
chooses.  In the South Texas district, there are financial incentives to use atoxigenics 
under YP coverage and non-insured scenarios.  However, in the South Texas district, 
there are financial incentives not to use atoxigenics under RP and RPHE coverage 
options.  The scenarios of treated non-insured, treated YP, not treated RP, and not 
treated RPHE return the highest net incomes in their respective categories.  However, 
not treated RP and not treated RPHE are ranked best for all risk averse decision makers 
   
103 
by the SERF ranking analysis.  The most cost effective scenario for the South Texas 
district is not treating and having RPHE coverage.   
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Atoxigenics and crop insurance are tools producers can use to guard against 
losses from aflatoxin.  There are several studies measuring the cost effectiveness of 
using atoxigenics for aflatoxin control in corn.  This study expands a previous study on 
aflatoxin in Bell County to the rest of Texas.  In addition to expanding the reach of the 
earlier study to the rest of the state, the current study used the One Sample Strategy for 
aflatoxin testing. The current study performs an economic analysis of using atoxigenics 
for aflatoxin control in Texas. 
 The study uses Simetar©, an Excel add-in, to simulate a risk based partial budget 
model combined with an aflatoxin contamination model.  Stochastic net incomes are 
simulated to assist with the decision to use atoxigenics for aflatoxin control.  SERF was 
used to estimate risk ranking for risk averse DMs, based on simulated net incomes for all 
crop insurance coverages available under non-treated and treated scenarios.  Net 
incomes are simulated for nine agricultural districts in Texas.  Field data for aflatoxin 
contamination is from Bell County, Texas.  Isakiet, a plant pathologist at Texas A&M 
Agrilife Extension, rated the remaining district’s aflatoxin contamination levels relative 
to Bell County. The aflatoxin probability distributions for the Blacklands were adjusted 
to reflect the relative mean and variance indicated by Isakeit’s ranking of aflatoxin 
incidence.  The current study should assist the farmers by considering the risk of 
aflatoxin contamination, contamination level, aflatoxin test inaccuracies, cost of 
atoxigenic, cost of insurance premiums, crop insurance indemnity payments, and 
stochastic local yields and market prices.  The objective of this study is to perform an 
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economic analysis on the decision to use atoxigenic treatments on corn crops for 
aflatoxin control, and to evaluate the economic outcome of different crop insurance 
levels for corn producers in Texas. 
 Ignore crop insurance results shows atoxigenics provide financial benefits for 
seven of the nine Texas agricultural districts in the study.  The treated non-insured net 
incomes of the Blacklands, Coastal Bend, Edwards Plateau, Lower Valley, South 
Central, South Texas, and Upper Coast districts were $10/acre to $40/acre higher than 
the not treated, non-insured net incomes for the same districts.  The Northern High 
Plains and Southern High Plains district’s non-insured results show that it is not cost 
effective to use atoxigenics.  The treated non-insured net incomes from the Northern 
High Plains and Southern High Plains were $4.07 and $7.43 lower, respectively, than the 
not treated, non-insured net incomes.  
 Crop insurance premiums for 2015, set by RMA, and simulated indemnity 
payments were incorporated into the model for all crop insurance options available to 
corn producers in their respective districts under non-treated and treated scenarios.  The 
results showed using atoxigenics for aflatoxin control in corn was cost effective in six of 
the nine agricultural districts. Net incomes for treated scenarios for the Blacklands, 
Coastal Bend, Edwards Plateau, Lower Valley, South Central, and Upper Coast districts 
were higher than non-treated scenarios.  The net incomes of treatment scenarios for 
Northern High Plains and Southern High Plains were lower than the net incomes of non-
treated scenarios.  The South Texas results were mixed.  Net incomes for non-insured 
and YP coverage treated scenarios were higher than the net incomes for non-insured and 
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YP coverage non-treated scenarios.  However, net incomes for non-treated RP and non-
treated RPHE scenarios were higher than the net incomes for treated RP and RPHE 
scenarios. The most preferred scenario ranked by SERF for the South Texas district was 
non-treated RPHE coverage for all risk averse decision makers. 
 As of April 2014, 29 grain elevators in Texas use the One Sample Strategy for 
aflatoxin testing.  The aflatoxin simulation in this study assumed one test for both the 
grain elevator and crop insurance purposes.  Although this method of testing is 
becoming more common across grain elevators in Texas, elevators that do not participate 
with the One Sample Strategy could have different testing results than the crop insurance 
companies.  For future studies in this area, one might factor in the producer rejecting the 
first grain elevator and driving to another elevator that does not use testing equipment 
required for the One Sample Method Strategy qualifications.  The less efficient testing 
equipment typically results in a lower RIV (Park et al., 2007).   
 This study could also be applicable to other regions of the United States.  Local 
prices and yields and aflatoxin information can be provided for other areas for an 
economic analysis.  The most important factor that could be added to this study is the 
effect that yield reductions from aflatoxin contamination have on the decision to buy 
insurance over time as lower yields reduce farmers’ approved production history (APH).  
This study simulated data for a one year analysis.  An additional study that measures the 
reduction of yield over time due to losses from aflatoxin contamination could account 
for longer-term impacts on APH.  For example, in 10 years the yield history of a farm 
that did not used atoxigenics could be a considerably lower than the yield history of a 
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farm that did use atoxigenics.  The lower yield history reduces the farm’s APH and thus 
the amount of indemnities the farm can potentially receive.  This study showed that 
higher indemnities for non-treated fields are a critical factor when determining aflatoxin 
cost effectiveness.    
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